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Katherine C Hall* and Charles M Meadows, Jr. **
I. FRANCHISE TAXES
A. Cases
Texas utilizes the location-of-payor rule to determine whether receipts
from interest or dividends should be allocated to a corporation's gross re-
ceipts from business done in Texas for the purpose of computing the
franchise tax.' Under the location-of-payor rule, the domicile of the payor
or debtor is dispositive: interest or dividends paid by a Texas corporation
are included in the payee's gross receipts from business done in Texas. If
paid by a foreign corporation, however, the receipts are excluded from the
payee's receipts for business done in Texas. 2 Prior to 1974, interest and
dividend income paid by national banks located in Texas was not included
in a corporate payee's Texas gross receipts since national banks were
treated as foreign corporations. 3 Effective January 1, 1973, however, the
United States Congress, through Public Law 91-156, declared that for pur-
poses of any state law a national bank should be treated as if organized
and existing under the laws of the state within which its principal office is
located.4 In reliance on this legislation, the Texas comptroller determined
in 1974 that dividends and interest received from national banks located in
Texas should be included in the Texas gross receipts of the corporate
payee.5
The validity of the 1974 comptroller's ruling was put into issue in Bul-
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; M.L.S., Texas Women's University; J.D.,
Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Kasmir, Willingham & Krage, Dallas,
Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Durant, Mankoff, Davis, Wolens
& Francis, Dallas, Texas.
1. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 179-80 (Tex. 1967).
2. Id. at 175, 180.
3. See, e.g., Silco, Inc. v. Calvert, 482 S.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. Public Law No. 91-156, as amended, is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976).
5. In 1974 the comptroller issued rule 80.0.18, which, as amended by Comptroller of
Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.12.013(2)(t) (1976), provides:
The "location of payor" test is used in determining whether dividends and
interest are attributable as receipts from business done in Texas. In accord-
ance with that test, dividends and interest paid by a domestic corporation are
includible in gross receipts from business done in Texas, whereas dividends
and interest paid by a foreign corporation do not constitute Texas gross re-
ceipts. Consequently: . . . (2) Dividends and interest paid on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1973 by a national bank whose principal office is located within Texas
are includible in gross receipts from business done in Texas.
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lock v. National Bancshares Corp.6 Taxpayers, several national bank hold-
ing companies and one ordinary business corporation, had sought to
recover in excess of $2,000,000 in franchise taxes that were paid under pro-
test on interest received from their national bank subsidiaries located in
Texas. Although the trial court denied relief,7 the court of civil appeals
reversed, 8 holding that the taxpayers could recover all sums paid. Upon
review, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the 1974 comptroller's ruling
holding that, under the location-of-payor rule, interest and dividends re-
ceived by a corporation from a national bank located in Texas are includ-
able in the corporation's gross receipts for the purpose of assessing a
franchise tax.9 Thus, the court reasoned that the interest and dividends
were properly included in determining the allocation percentage used to
compute the gross receipts taxable by Texas under article 12.02(1)(b), con-
cluding that the taxpayers could not recover the taxes paid earlier.' 0
Accounting Methods. In Bullock v. Enserch Corp.I I the Waco court of
civil appeals approved a taxpayer's use of the cost method of accounting
for franchise tax reporting purposes even though the taxpayer had used
temporarily the equity method in its general ledger account to reflect the
earnings of its subsidiaries. The comptroller's rules in effect during the
disputed taxable years had required the taxpayer to report and calculate
the franchise tax using the same accounting method that the taxpayer used
to maintain its general ledger account. Before 1973, the taxpayer used the
cost method to reflect both its actual cost of investing in the stock of its
subsidiaries and to determine the amount of franchise tax due.' 2 In 1973,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ordered the taxpayer
to report its unappropriated, undistributed subsidiary earnings. The tax-
payer responded to the order by amending its system of accounting to re-
flect a subaccount entry, reporting these earnings under the equity method
of accounting. The subaccount entry was eliminated after the close of the
accounting year since its only purpose was to provide the information re-
quired by the FERC. After elimination of the subaccount entry, the bal-
6. 584 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. 1979).
7. 584 S.W.2d at 269. The district court opinion in National Baneshares is discussed in
Rosenbaum, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 515, 518-19 (1978).
8. National Bancshares Corp. v. Bullock, 569 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1978). The court of civil appeals decisions and the historical development of the legislative
and administrative actions affecting the imposition of the franchise tax on the dividends and
interest in question are discussed in Rosenbaum, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 569, 572-74 (1979).
9. 584 S.W.2d at 274.
10. Id.
I1. 583 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The district court
decision is noted in Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 575.
12. The franchise tax is based on the amount of a corporation's stated capital, surplus,
and undivided profits as multiplied by a percentage allocation formula that reflects the per-
centage of gross receipts from business done in Texas. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.01(l)(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1980). Since the corporation's "surplus" includes its investments in its sub-
sidiaries, 583 S.W.2d at 951, its franchise taxes can be substantially increased if, as the comp-
troller sought to do in Enserch, the tax is imposed on the unappropriated undistributed
subsidiary earnings in addition to the actual cost of investing in the stock of the subsidiaries.
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ance of the general ledger account reflected the taxpayer's investment in its
subsidiaries on the cost method. The comptroller nevertheless insisted on
assessing the amount of the taxpayer's franchise tax based on the tax-
payer's financial report that reflected the equity accounting method. 13 In
affirming the trial court's decision in favor of the taxpayer, the Waco court
of civil appeals held that the comptroller's method of assessing the tax had
been arbitrary and fundamentally wrong.' 4 The court apparently charac-
terized the assessment as arbitrary because the taxpayer's use of the equity
method was both temporary and involuntary. Thus, this opinion may pro-
vide some support for the position that an accounting method must be
used consistently by a taxpayer before the comptroller can require that the
franchise tax, or other taxes, be computed on the basis of that method.
The court in Enserch also noted that in 1977 the comptroller amended
the ruling in question to assess in accordance with the cost accounting
method franchise taxes on corporations in the same category as the tax-
payer.15 This change was made upon the realization that the ruling as
previously written was unfair because it taxed a parent corporation on the
same earnings that had been taxed to its subsidiary corporations.' 6 The
court probably based its description of the assessment as fundamentally
wrong on the subsequent amendment and the rationale leading to the
amendment therefor. In light of this holding, taxpayers litigating against
the comptroller may find it profitable to analyze the comptroller's subse-
quent changes in position in order to discern a basis for challenging rulings
in issue as "fundamentally wrong."
Procedure. Two franchise tax cases dealt with procedural aspects of liti-
gating franchise tax liability. In Cine-Matics, Inc. v. State ' 7 the taxpayer
appealed from a default judgment that had resulted in an assessment of
$60,000 for unlawfully transacting business in Texas without a certificate
of authority, as well as an order to pay all overdue franchise taxes, penal-
ties, and interest. Prior to the default judgment, the taxpayer had been
enjoined permanently from transacting business in Texas without a certifi-
cate of authority. Subsequently, the taxpayer obtained a certificate of au-
thority that was later forfeited for failure to pay franchise taxes. The
taxpayer nevertheless allegedly continued to transact business within
Texas. The taxpayer's attorney was served with notice directing the tax-
payer to appear at a show cause hearing. The taxpayer failed to appear
and was held in contempt, fined $500 therefor, and assessed the above
amounts. The Austin court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's assess-
ment for the $60,000 judgment, interest, penalties, and overdue franchise
taxes, concluding that article 8.18.C of the Texas Business Corporation Act
13. Under the equity method, the taxpayer's franchise tax liability would have been
increased by over $400,000.
14. 583 S.W.2d at 952.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 578 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
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required the filing of a new suit to recover these amounts. 18 The court
further concluded that the relaxed rules of service for a show cause hearing
for contempt were inapplicable and that, in the absence of a showing that
the corporation's attorney was authorized to accept service for the corpora-
tion, such service would be unlawful.' 9 The court therefore held that the
trial court could not enter an order assessing liability for overdue taxes of
this nature, together with penalties and interest.20
On the issue of the validity of the trial court's finding of contempt and
the $500 fine imposed therefor, the court of civil appeals held that it lacked
jurisdiction to review that portion of the trial court's order. The court
noted that the settled law of Texas prohibited review of a contempt order
by any means other than a writ of habeas corpus.2' Although this rule
foreclosed the taxpayer and others in a similar position from obtaining
judicial review of a trial court's contempt order,22 the court concluded that
it would be inappropriate for it to change such a long-standing rule.23 The
significance of Cine-Matics is that foreign corporations may be held in
contempt for violating an injunction that prohibits doing business in Texas
without a certificate of authority. Further, the relaxed rules of service al-
lowed for a show cause hearing for contempt may apply in such an in-
stance.24 A more stringent service of process requirement must be met,
however, before the corporation can be fined for transacting business with-
out this certificate or assessed for overdue franchise taxes.25
18. Id. at 531. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18.C (Vernon 1956) provides:
A foreign corporation which transacts business in this State without a certifi-
cate of authority shall be liable to this State, for the years or parts thereof
during which it transacted business in this State without a certificate of au-
thority, in an amount equal to all fees and franchise taxes which would have
been imposed by law upon such corporation had it duly applied for and re-
ceived a certificate of authority to transact business in this State ... plus all
penalties imposed by law for failure to pay such fees and franchise taxes. In
addition to the penalties and payments thus prescribed, such corporation shall
forfeit to this State an amount not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100) nor
more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) for each month or fraction thereof
it shall have transacted business in this State without a certificate.
19. 578 S.W.2d at 531.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 531-32.
22. Id. at 532. Since the taxpayer was not imprisoned, the writ of habeas corpus was
unavailable as a means ofjudicial review.
23. Id.
24. The propriety of utilizing relaxed rules of service in a show cause hearing is left
unanswered by the court's opinion because it lacked jurisdiction to address the validity of
the contempt order. It appears, therefore, that until direct appeal is accepted by the Texas
courts as a proper method of review of contempt orders or until the question is challenged
successfully by a person imprisoned as a result of a contempt finding, the trial courts may
continue to authorize the use of relaxed service methods.
25. The court noted that the service of process requirements for a new suit under TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18(C) (Vernon 1956) were provided by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) and TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10 (Vernon 1956).
The court's rationale in referring to the latter is unclear. Article 8.10 deals with service of
process on a foreign corporation "authorized to transact business in this State." Since the
taxpayer here was unauthorized to do business in Texas, service could not have been made
under this article. Article 2031b, however, is not limited to service on those corporations
authorized to do business and properly would be applied in this instance. For a general
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The second case dealing with the procedural aspects of litigation in con-
nection with franchise tax liability was Paris Milling Co. v. Bullock.26 The
Waco court of civil appeals in Paris Milling affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal with prejudice of the taxpayer's two suits to have certain deficiency
assessments set aside and to recover taxes paid under protest. The court
held that the Administrative Procedure Act had not repealed the require-
ment of article 1.05 that a suit for refund of taxes paid under protest be
brought within ninety days of payment. 27 Since the taxpayer had failed to
pay the disputed taxes before filing its first suit, the court lacked jurisdic-
tion under article 1.05. As to the second suit, the taxpayer paid the dis-
puted taxes and filed suit against the comptroller within ninety days of the
date that the taxes were paid under protest. The taxpayer failed, however,
to join the state treasurer and attorney general within the ninety-day pe-
riod as provided in article 1.05. The court concluded that the provision
providing for joinder of all three officials within ninety days of the pay-
ment is a jurisdictional requirement. Since the taxpayers failed to meet
this requirement, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the suit
under article 1.05(2).28
Although the court's first holding regarding the Administrative Proce-
dure Act dealt with a point twice considered previously by the Austin court
of appeals,29 the holding with respect to joinder appears to be a decision of
first impression. The court reasoned that the language regarding suits for
recovery of taxes expressly required the joinder of the three officials, bas-
ing its conclusion on the sentence: "Such suit shall be brought against the
public official charged with the duty of collecting such tax or fees, the State
Treasurer and the Attorney General. ' 30 The court's holding requires not
only joinder of these three parties, but also joinder within the ninety-day
period specified in article 1.05(2).
B. Legislative Developments
Short Form Franchise Tax Return. During the survey period, the Texas
legislature amended four provisions pertaining to franchise taxes. An
amendment to article 12.19 extends the optional use of the short form
discussion of this provision, see Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Article 2031b." A
New Process Is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747 (1976).
26. 583 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
27. Id. at 489. The 90-day limitation on seeking the refund of taxes is provided by TEX.
TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980), which states:
Upon the payment of such taxes or fees, accompanied by such written protest,
the taxpayer shall have ninety (90) days from said date within which to file
suit for the recovery thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction in Travis
County, Texas, and none other. Such suit shall be brought against the public
official charged with the duty of collecting such tax or fees, the State Treasurer
and the Attorney General.
28. 583 S.W.2d at 489.
29. The argument that the Administrative Procedure Act repealed article 1.05 had pre-
viously been rejected. Dan Ingle, Inc. v. Bullock, 578 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1979, writ ref'd); Robinson v. Bullock, 553 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, writ ref d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978).
30. 583 S.W.2d at 488 (citing TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980)).
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franchise tax return to those corporations having total assets of less than
$1,000,000 on the last day of their taxable year for federal income tax pur-
poses. 3' Previously, optional use was restricted to those corporations with
total assets of less than $150,000.32 The amendment also changes a timing
requirement, since the last day of the corporation's taxable year must fall
within the twelve-month period preceding January 1 of the year in which
the franchise tax is due.33 Before this change, the last day had to fall
within the twelve-month period preceding February 1.34
Prepayment of Initial $100 Franchise Tax Deposit. An amendment to arti-
cle 12.06 requires the prepayment of an initial $100 franchise tax deposit
by all domestic corporations that incorporate under the Texas Business
Corporation Act or the Texas Professional Corporation Act or foreign cor-
porations qualifying under the Texas Business Corporation Act. 35 Under
article 12.06, a foreign corporation is required to make a $500 security
deposit to insure that all franchise taxes, penalties, and interest will be paid
by the corporation. 36 Prior to the 1979 amendments, the security deposit
was refundable only in the event the corporation ceased doing business in
the State of Texas before forfeiture of its certificate of authority and if the
corporation had paid all franchise taxes, penalties, and interest.37 The
1979 amendments provide, however, that the deposit is refundable upon a
finding by the comptroller that the corporation has maintained continuous
good standing for a period of three years or upon a determination that the
corporation is exempt from tax.3
8
Information Obtained from the Taxpayer for Franchise Tax Pur-
poses. Article 12.10 was amended to extend the protection of confidenti-
ality to all information, except information contained in liens filed
pursuant to title 122A, obtained from the taxpayer's records that are re-
quired to be furnished to comply with the franchise tax provision.39 Addi-
tionally, the amendment provides that all information obtained by the
state from an examination of the taxpayer's personal and business records
or from interviews with its employees is confidential and not open for pub-
lic inspection.40 Article 12.06 continues to provide, however, exceptions to
the rule of confidentiality that are similar to those that were provided for
prior to 1979.
4 1
Interest Rate on Delinquent Franchise Taxes. Finally, the legislature
31. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.19(I) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
32. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, Tax.-Gen., ch. 801, § 14, at 2375.
33. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.19(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
34. 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws, Tax.-Gen., 3d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, at 316.
35. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.06(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (effective Sept. 1, 1979).
36. Id. art. 12.06(3).
37. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, Tax.-Gen., ch. 801, § 3, at 2368.
38. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1206(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
39. Id. art. 12.10(a) (effective June 13, 1979).




amended article 12.14 to increase the statutory rate of interest from six
percent to seven percent on delinquent franchise taxes.42
C. Administrative Rules and Decisions
The comptroller has amended rule .0 13, which deals with the determina-
tion of a corporation's gross receipts derived from doing business in
Texas. 43 Under the former rule, gross receipts were determined in part by
aggregating the profits and losses from two or more partnerships or joint
ventures of which a corporation was a member. If a net loss resulted or if
the corporation participated in only one such entity that recognized a loss,
this loss resulted in zero receipts for purposes of calculating the franchise
tax. The amended rule, however, effectively precludes netting of the gains
and losses produced by different entities.44 Thus, losses from one partner-
ship or joint venture will not reduce profits from others.
In addition to the amendment of rule .013, the comptroller has proposed
an amendment to rule .011 in connection with the county ad valorem as-
sessed value measure of the franchise tax.45 The rule presently, and as
proposed, requires a corporation to report its franchise tax based on the
assessed value for county ad valorem tax purposes of all Texas property
owned by the corporation only when the tax based on this method exceeds
the applicable minimum tax and also exceeds the amount of franchise tax
that would be payable on the corporation's taxable capital.46 Under the
existing rule, ownership of property is attributable to a corporation if it has
legal title.47 As proposed, however, the rule would treat the possession of
legal title as creating a presumption that the holder is the owner, but would
allow this presumption to be overcome by a showing that equitable title is
vested in another entity.48 In the event the amendment is adopted, a cor-
poration holding equitable title to Texas property would be required to
42. Id. art. 12.14(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
43. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.12.013, 4 Tex. Reg. 1471 (1979).
44. Id. Rule 026.02.12.013(b)(19), 4 Tex. Reg. 1471 (1979), provides:
A corporation's share of the net profit from a partnership or joint venture in
which the corporation is a partner or joint venturer constitutes receipts to the
corporation. If the partnership or joint venture operates at a net loss, the cor-
poration's share of the loss results in zero receipts for franchise tax calcula-
tions. For the purpose of allocating receipts under article 12.02, receipts from
partnerships or joint ventures having their principal place of business in Texas
are considered Texas receipts.
45. Id. Proposed Rule 026.02.12.011, 4 Tex. Reg. 2125 (1979).
46. Id. Rule 026.02.12.01 !(1). Taxable capital is defined in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
12.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980), and is to be allocated to Texas gross receipts in accordance with
id. art. 12.02 (Vernon 1969).
47. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.12.011(5).
48. Id. Proposed Rule 026.02.12.001(e), 4 Tex. Reg. 2125 (1979). The proposed rule
provides that an entity has equitable title where it has such a present right to legal title that a
court could properly transfer legal title to the entity or where the entity is entitled to and, by
court order, could compel the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain pow-
ers by the holder of the legal title. Id. The proposed rule lists several examples of circum-
stances to be considered in establishing equitable title, including but not limited to contracts
of sale, and the use of such entities as trusts, partnerships, and joint ventures. Id. Proposed
Rule 026.02.1 2 .12.011 (g), 4 Tex. Reg. 2125 (1979).
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include the property in its franchise tax return. Finally, during the survey
period, the comptroller issued several administrative decisions regarding
gross receipts generally,49 the allocation formulas applied to gross re-
ceipts, 50 the definition of a corporation's surplus,5' and procedural mat-
ters.5
2
II. SALES AND USE TAXES
A. Cases
Exemptions from Sales Tax. In Bullock v. Lone Star Industries, Inc. 3 the
Waco court of civil appeals concluded that a cement manufacturer could
recover sales tax paid under protest upon the purchase of a floating clam-
shell dredge and carbon steel grinding balls. To support its holding that
the purchase price of the dredge was exempt from sales tax, 54 the court
49. The comptroller issued five administrative decisions regarding the general determi-
nation of gross receipts: Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9002 (1979) (since
chrome plating of aircraft cylinders by a corporation for customers is a service rather than a
sale, receipts from plating should be included as part of corporation's Texas receipts to ex-
tent that services are performed in Texas); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10407
(1979) (actual monies received under long-term construction contracts must be included in
Texas receipts where the taxpayer uses percentage of completion method of accounting for
purposes of reporting income from these contracts); Comptroller's Administrative Decision
No. 9838 (1979) (corporation's total gross receipts for franchise tax purposes include corpo-
ration's proportionate share of net profits from joint venture rather than its proportionate
share of gross receipts from venture) (Note the correlation between Comptroller's Adminis-
trative Decision No. 9838 and amended Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule
026.02.12.013(b)(19), 4 Tex. Reg. 1471 (1979).); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No.
10464 (1979) (payments made on installment sales are includable in corporation's gross re-
ceipts and Texas receipts for purposes of determining franchise tax in period during which
corporation receives payments); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9534 (1979)
(amounts received by corporation represented loans rather than part of gross receipts where
corporation had obtained financing from banks for construction projects, received advances
from banks on financing as work was completed, and booked advances as liabilities).
50. Four administrative decisions dealt with allocation formulas and inclusion of prop-
erty in tax base: Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9552 (1978) (where property
was under construction and was not being used by corporation, the corporation, which used
a three-factor formula in reporting franchise tax, did not have to include property in the
property factor); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10231 (1979) (corporation that
was required to report franchise tax based on assessed value for county ad valorem tax
purposes had to include all inventory and noninventory Texas real estate owned by corpora-
tion); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10388 (1979) (corporation, which was re-
quired to compute franchise tax based on assessed value of property owned, had both legal
and equitable title to property it contracted to sell because purchaser of property did not
make full payment after close of corporation's accounting year; therefore, corporation had to
include property in its tax base); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10062 (1979)
(corporation that manufactured prescription drugs and shipped to a Texas warehouse from
which they were sold had to include sales receipts in calculating Texas receipts since exempt
items being sold had not been shipped to Texas purchaser from outside state).
51. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9005 (1979) (corporation need not in-
clude in surplus for franchise tax purposes profit reflected on books with respect to transfers
between divisions since profit does not represent realized income but is a matter of internal
accounting control).
52. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9197 (1978) (before corporation's peti-
tion for alternative allocation formula will be considered, procedure in Comptroller's
Franchise Tax Rule 3 must be followed).
53. 584 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. Id. at 388.
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relied on the pre-1975 statutory language of article 20.04(P)(1).55 Prior to
1975, article 20.04(P)(1) exempted from sales tax the receipts from a sale of
a vessel that was both built in the State of Texas and purchased from the
builder of the vessel. 56 Although this article did not define vessel, a comp-
troller's ruling defines it to include "every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water."' 57 Since no Texas court had previously analyzed
article 20.04(P)(1) or the comptroller's definition of vessel, the court ex-
amined the federal cases that had analyzed the meaning of the term vessel
under a federal statute58 defining vessel with language identical to that
used in the comptroller's ruling. The court noted that these cases had held
that dredges with physical characteristics similar to those of the taxpayer
were vessels. Relying on these federal decisions59 and the comptroller's
definition of a vessel, the court concluded that the taxpayer's dredge was a
vessel within the meaning of article 20.04(P)(1) and, therefore, the tax-
payer could recover the sales tax that it had previously paid under pro-
test.60
Relying on article 20.04(E)(1), 61 the court also held that the sales re-
ceipts from the taxpayer's purchase of the carbon steel grinding balls were
55. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 25, at 77. In 1977 art. 20.04(P)(1) was
amended to provide:
There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this Chapter the receipts from
the sale, lease or rental of, or the storage, use or other consumption in this
State of materials, equipment and machinery which enter into and become
component parts of ships or vessels exclusively and directly used in a commer-
cial enterprise, including commercial fishing vessels, and vessels used com-
mercially as vessels for pleasure fishing by individuals as paying passengers
thereon, of eight (8) tons displacement and over, and the receipts from the sale
of such ships or vessels exclusively and directly used in a commercial enter-
prise when sold by the builder thereof, and repair services, renovation, and/or
conversion, including labor and materials to such ships or vessels exclusively
and directly used in a commercial enterprise.
TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(P)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980). The court's holding is not af-
fected by the 1975 amendments since the dredge was used exclusively in a commercial enter-
prise and the taxpayer apparently purchased the dredge from the builder.
56. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 25, at 77.
57. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts Rule .026.02.20.017(a)(2) (1978) (previously Rule 95-
.0.14).
58. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
59. One Supreme Court case cited as support for this statement did not analyze whether
the dredge involved constituted a vessel. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370,
371 n. 1 (1957) ("No question has been raised at any time as to whether the dredge involved
here had the status of a 'vessel' at the time of petitioner's injury.") The dissenting justices,
however, made the assumption that the dredge could be regarded as a vessel. Id. at 375 n. I
(Harlan, J. dissenting). Similarly, authority from the Fifth Circuit, McKie v. Diamond
Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953), contained no analysis of whether the dredge could
be defined as a vessel. Presumably, therefore, there has never been a real issue, under the
definition noted above, of whether a dredge is a vessel; its status as such is unquestionable.
The real question, then, is why the comptroller in Lone Star attempted to tax the taxpayer's
dredge and, on appeal, asserted that the trial court erred in holding that the dredge was a
vessel. Unfortunately, the rationale, if any, for the comptroller's position was not discussed
by the court.
60. 584 S.W.2d at 388.
61. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(E)(1) (Vernon 1969) provides in part:
There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this Chapter the receipts from
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tax exempt. Article 20.04(E)(1) exempts from sales tax the sales receipts
from tangible property that becomes a component part of tangible per-
sonal property62 manufactured for retail sale. The evidence showed that
the grinding balls were used to grind down raw materials during the man-
ufacturing process, and as a result of the grinding process, ninety-eight
percent of the material of each ball became a necessary component part of
the taxpayer's finished product. On these facts, the court concluded that
the grinding balls were tangible personal property that became component
parts of the taxpayer's finished product and, therefore, fell within the tax
exemption provided by article 20.04(E)(1). 63
In First National Bank v. Bullock64 the taxpayer sought to recover sales
taxes paid under protest on payments it made to obtain a license to use
certain computer programs that were delivered on magnetic tapes. More
than $109,000 had been paid to four computer software companies for a
program or set of instructions on magnetic tape that would enable the
bank's computer to perform essential banking functions. The trial court
held that the bank could not recover its payments of tax for the licenses.
On appeal, the Austin court reversed, holding that the sale of a license for
computer software on magnetic tapes was exempt from sales tax even
though the magnetic tapes were tangible personal property.65 The court of
civil appeals applied the "essence of the transaction" test, which provides
an approach for determining whether a sale is of tangible or intangible
property.66 Under this test, when the object or essence of the sale is intan-
gible property, the transaction will not be taxable since intangible property
is exempt from tax.67 The court decided that the essence of the transaction
was the purchase of the computer process, rather than the purchase of four
tapes. The court then concluded that the "process" was not tangible per-
sonal property within the meaning of article 20.01(p),68 but intangible
property, which is exempt from the limited sales tax.69 In support of its
the sale, lease or rental of, and the storage, use or other consumption in this
State of:
(a) tangible personal property which will enter into and become an ingredi-
ent or component part of tangible personal property manufactured, processed
or fabricated for ultimate sale at retail within or without this State ....
62. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(P) (Vernon 1969) defines tangible personal prop-
erty as "personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched, or which
is in any other manner perceptible to the senses."
63. 584 S.W.2d at 388.
64. 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. Id. at 551.
66. Id. at 550.
67. Id.
68. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(P) (Vernon 1969). For the statutory definition of
tangible personal property, see note 62 supra.
69. Id. The court noted that the information also could have been transmitted by
keypunch cards, telephone, or other methods and considered this fact important in arriving
at its decision that the essence of the transaction was the sale of an intangible. The court
apparently reasoned that since the programs could have been transmitted by other methods,
including intangibles, the essence of the transaction could not have been the means by which
the programs would be transmitted. Perhaps a better explanation for the court's holding is
found in its reliance on Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977),
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holding, the court reasoned that "[u]nlike a phonograph record or film-
strip, when the information on the tape, in the present case, is transferred
to the computer, the tape is no longer of any value or importance to the
user."'70 Whether the programs or information sold is "canned" or "cus-
tomized," is of no relevance; the relevant question in each case is whether
the object of the sale is tangible personal property. Without specifically so
stating, the court appears to have rested its characterization of the sale of a
license for software as an intangible on the basis of viewing the transaction
as one in which services were performed. 71
The taxpayer in First National Bank also challenged the comptroller's
assessment of sales taxes on payments made by the taxpayer to a corpora-
tion that provided and prepared food on the taxpayer's premises for the
taxpayer's employees and guests. The taxpayer argued that the corpora-
tion used the taxpayer's cooking and serving equipment, was controlled to
some extent by the taxpayer, and was claimed by the taxpayer to be its
agent.72 Therefore, none of the payments made to the corporation should
be subject to sales tax. The appellate court concluded, however, that the
facts showed that the corporation was an independent contractor and the
charges for preparing and serving the food were indeed subject to sales
tax.
73
In Davis-Kemp Tool Co. v. Bullock74 the taxpayer appealed from a judg-
ment denying him relief for sales taxes paid under protest on consideration
paid by the taxpayer for the rental of tools and equipment from its suppli-
ers. In its business, the taxpayer leased equipment from various suppliers
and subsequently furnished the equipment, with operators, to its custom-
ers. The taxpayer claimed that its lease of tools to its customers was ex-
empt from tax under article 20.04(O)(1),75 which exempts from sales and
use tax the receipts from a re-lease that is an integral part of a taxable
service rendered in the ordinary course of business. The district court held
that the transactions between the taxpayer and its suppliers were taxable
leases and found in favor of the comptroller. The Beaumont court of civil
and Williams & Lee Scouting Serv., Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1970, writ refd). In each case the court looked to the essence of the transaction and found
that providing data by tangible means constituted a nontaxable service rather than the sale
of tangible property. These cases and First National Bank should not be construed, how-
ever, as authority for the proposition that all sales of services are not subject to sales tax.
The cases clearly indicate that if the underlying object of the service is the sale of tangible
rather than intangible property, the receipts from the services are subject to the sales tax.
70. 584 S.W.2d at 550.
71. See note 69 supra.
72. 584 S.W.2d at 552. The court stated that the question of whether an independent
contractor or agency relationship exists depends on the question of who has control and that
the determination of who has control depends on who has control over how it shall be done,
not what shall be done. Id. at 551-52.
73. Id. at 552. Once the court found that the corporation was an independent contrac-
tor, it had little difficulty in establishing the taxability of the payments since the food consti-
tuted a sale of tangible personal property. Id. at 551.
74. 584 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 23
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 87 (Nov. 28, 1979).
75. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(O)(1) (Vernon 1969).
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appeals affirmed the trial court, but based its affirmance on entirely differ-
ent grounds. The court of appeals concluded that the taxpayer was an
independent contractor. As a result, the court decided that the tax was
incurred not when the tools were leased from the suppliers, but rather
when the plaintiff used the tools and operators as an independent contrac-
tor to service its customers' needs. 76 In a per curiam refusal of the tax-
payer's petition for writ of error, the supreme court affirmed both the trial
court and court of civil appeals. The supreme court concluded, however,
that the court of civil appeals had erred in concluding that the transactions
between the taxpayer and its customers were taxable. 77 Rather, the court
concluded, the customer transactions were exempt, but the taxpayer's
transactions with its suppliers were taxable. 78
Credits and Refunds. The Austin court of civil appeals in Amoco Produc-
tion Co. v. Bullock 79 held that the comptroller's failure to follow the statu-
tory procedure for credits and refunds relieved the taxpayer of the
obligation to pay additional taxes that must normally be paid under article
1.05 before a suit for recovery of taxes paid under protest may be brought.
Although the comptroller had tendered credit for substantial overpay-
ments by the taxpayer, these were refused and a request for refund was
made. The comptroller failed, however, to refund the overpayment as he
was authorized to do under article 1.1 IA.80 His failure to refund provided
a basis for relieving the taxpayer of the payment that generally is required
to provide a court with jurisdiction before it can entertain a suit for re-
fund.8l The Austin court stated that a suit may be maintained for the pro-
tection of rights under an inherent right of appeal, which exists where a
vested property right has been affected adversely by the action of an ad-
ministrative body or where officials act without lawful authorization to
deny or violate rights such as those involved here.82 The significance of
this case is that the comptroller, in his efforts to increase or protect state
revenues, must act in accordance with the statutes governing the exercise
of his responsibilities to taxpayers as well as to the state.
76. 584 S.W.2d at 581. In rejecting the taxpayer's argument that the entire transaction
should be viewed as a re-lease, the court of civil appeals relied on a 1969 comptroller's ruling
that provided that a transaction in which equipment was leased with an operator was not a
lease. Id. at 580. In 1977, however, the comptroller issued a ruling that provides that (1)
where equipment is leased with an operator and the customer is billed separately for the
equipment and the operator, a taxable lease will be presumed to exist as to the equipment,
and (2) where equipment is leased with an operator and the customer is billed a single
charge for both, the receipts shall be presumed to be charges for services and tax exempt.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.014 (I)(b)-(c). The rule also provides, how-
ever, certain criteria that will rebut the above presumptions. Id. Rule 026.02.20.014(l)(d).
77. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 87-88.
78. Id.
79. 584 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ granted).
80. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art 1.05 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1980).
81. 584 S.W.2d at 391.
82. Id. at 391-92.
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B. Administrative Rules and Decisions
Rulemaking. During the survey period, the comptroller issued four new
rules, amended several existing rules,83 and repealed others.84 The first
83. Following is a brief summary of some of the amendments made to the comptrolier's
sales and use tax rulings during the survey period. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule
026.02.20.004 has been amended to incorporate the new statutory exemption for certain
equipment and supplies used to enable deaf persons to communicate through an ordinary
telephone. 4 Tex. Reg. 3985 (1979). This provision is retroactive to Aug. 27, 1979, the effec-
tive date of the statutory amendment providing the new exemption. Comptroller of Pub.
Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.006, relating to seller's responsibilities in the collection of sales tax,
has been amended effective Jan. 30, 1980, to clarify the existing rule, as well as to add
definitions of "retainer" and "place of business," define the responsibilities of the seller, and
change the interest rate from six percent to seven percent on penalties assessed against tax-
payers who are more than 60 days delinquent in filing a monthly return together with pay-
ment. 5 Tex. Reg. 135-36 (1980). Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.008,
relating to direct payment procedures, has been amended to add a provision on storage
facilities that brings the rule in conformity with rule 026.02.20.066, 4 Tex. Reg. 993 (1979).
The amendment also deletes all references to local tax allocation, which the comptroller has
determined to be more appropriately addressed by rule 026.02.20.066. The amendment be-
came effective on May 25, 1979. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.009, relating
to alcoholic beverage exemptions, has been amended to incorporate the statutory presump-
tion in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.02 1(F) (Vernon Supp. 1980) that certain sales of liquor,
wine, beer, or malt liquor constitute sales for resale and that no resale certificate will be
required. 3 Tex. Reg. 2562-63 (1978). This amendment is retroactive to Aug. 29, 1977, the
effective date of the statutory change creating this presumption. Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Rule 026.02.20.015, relating to natural gas and electricity, has been amended to in-
corporate the 1978 statutory change that provided the residential exemption for gas and
electricity. 3 Tex. Reg. 3571 (1978). This amendment is retroactive to Oct. 1, 1978, the
effective date of the statute creating this exemption. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule
026.02.20.017, concerning carriers, has been amended to define the term "licensed course of
instruction" to mean "pilot training or instruction conducted by a flight training school
which has been certified or granted provisional certification under Federal Aviation Admin-
istration regulations." 3 Tex. Reg. 3353-54 (1978). This change is effective prospectively.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.020, relating to manufacturing, has been
amended effective Nov. 16, 1979. 4 Tex. Reg. 3985-87 (1979). The amendment clarifies and
outlines the exemptions for materials necessary and essential to the manufacturing process
from the requirement that manufacturers must collect sales tax on the price of their manu-
factured products. An exemption is specifically provided for machinery, equipment, re-
placement parts, and accessories having a useful life of less than six months. Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.020(d)(6). 4 Tex. Reg. 3987 (1979). To make clear the mean-
ing of "useful life," the amendment codifies the comptroller's present definition. Id. Comp-
troller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.044, relating to oil, gas and related well service, has
been amended to clarify the sale tax policy on oil well servicing. 4 Tex. Reg. 2142-43 (1979).
This amendment, too, is retroactive. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.045, re-
lating to refunds and payments under protest, has been amended to reflect the comptroller's
position that only persons who have paid taxes directly to the state are in a position to claim
refunds from the state and also provides procedures for obtaining refunds from sellers on
taxes that were paid directly to the seller. In addition, the amendment states that where
taxes are paid under protest pursuant to art. 1.05, the amount protested will be placed in a
suspended fund until the disputed issue is resolved. 4 Tex. Reg. 1105 (1979). Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.059, which deals with the statute of limitations, has been
amended to reflect the court's decision in Lorenzo Textile Mills, Inc. v. Bullock, 566 S.W.2d
107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ), that the limitations period for assessment by the
comptroller of sales and use tax deficiency determinations is four years, while the limitations
period for collection of the deficiency is three years. This amendment also addresses the
limitations periods regarding successor liability, notices of delinquency, and seizure power.
3 Tex. Reg. 3837 (1978). The amendment is effective retroactive to the date of the Textile
Mills decision. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.065, dealing with solar energy
devices, has been amended to clarify that component and repair and replacement parts that
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new rule, rule .066, relates to the use tax and incorporates and organizes all
existing statutory references to that tax.85 The effective date of rule .066 is
retroactive to March 7, 1979. In part, the rule creates a presumption that
tangible personal property purchased and used outside of Texas for more
than one year before the date of entry into Texas will not be presumed to
have been purchased for use in Texas. The rule requires that the taxpayer
establish four factors: (1) the property was purchased outside of Texas; (2)
the property was used outside of Texas for more than one year from the
date of purchase; (3) such use was substantial; and (4) the use was a pri-
mary use for which the property was purchased.86 Since property may
frequently be used in several ways, taxpayers contemplating the purchase
and use outside of Texas of property that might otherwise incur a substan-
tial use tax should document carefully the purposes for which the property
was purchased. Such documentation could be of significant importance in
the event of subsequent litigation regarding the issue of the "primary use"
for which the property was purchased.
The second new rule, rule .067, defines activities that constitute im-
provements to realty as well as those that do not qualify as improvements
to realty.8 7 This rule, too, is retroactive and was made effective February
are made integral parts of solar energy systems will qualify for exemption. 4 Tex. Reg. 553
(1979). This amendment is retroactive.
84. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rules 026.02.20.050 and 026.02.20.063 were repealed
and incorporated into Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.020, which concerns
manufacturing, custom manufacturing, and fabricating processes. 4 Tex. Reg. 4536 (1979).
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.030 was repealed and incorporated into
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.006, which relates to sales tax permits. 4 Tex.
Reg. 4536 (1979).
85. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.066(b)(5), 4 Tex. Reg. 554 (1979).
86. Id.
87. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.067, 4 Tex. Reg. 218 (1979). This
rule provides:
(a) "Contract for the improvement to realty" includes a contract with the
intended purpose to:
(1) erect, construct, alter, or repair any building or other structure, pro-
ject, development, or other permanent improvement on, under the
surface of, or to real property, whether fee or leasehold; or
(2) furnish and install property becoming a part of any building or
other structure, project, development, or other permanent improve-
ment on or to such real property including tangible personal prop-
erty, which after installation becomes real property by virtue of
being embedded in or permanently affixed to the land or to a struc-
ture constituting realty and which property after installation is nec-
essary to the intended usefulness of the building or other structure;
or
(3) alter the land surface of real property by such means as creating
roads, earthen dams, and stock tanks. However, mining or timber
operations do not, in and of themselves, constitute improvements to
realty.
(b) "Contract for the improvement to realty" does not include:
(1) a contract for the sale and installation of tangible personal prop-
erty; this includes a contract to furnish and install machinery,
equipment, or other tangible property not essential to the building
or structure, nor adapted or intended to become a part of the realty,
but which incidentally may, on account of its nature, be tempora-
rily attached to the realty without losing its identity as a particular
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7, 1979. Rule .067 provides that a contract for the improvement to realty
includes contracts entered into "with the intended purpose" to engage in
several kinds of activity in three different categories. 88 The rule does not
state that the permissible activities are limited to those contained in the
rule. Presumably, however, because of the "intended purpose" language, a
taxpayer who intended to engage in any of the specified activities could do
things other than those set forth in the rule and yet successfully maintain
that he had made improvements to realty. The rule also provides three
categories of activities that do not qualify as improvements to realty.89
The third rule, rule .068, clarifies the tax consequences resulting from
the purchase of tangible personal property for the purpose of adding acces-
sories to motor vehicles.90 The effective date of the rule is April 4, 1979.
Rule .068 provides that "the term 'accessories' includes but is not limited
to bodies, cement mixers, C.B. radios, refrigeration units, fertilizer spread-
ers, and oil well servicing equipment." 9' Although the purchase of a mo-
tor vehicle and all accessories attached thereto at the time of sale is subject
to the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Sales and Use Tax, where accesso-
ries are purchased and attached after the time of sale, the purchase is sub-
ject to the provisions of the Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax.92
Finally, the fourth rule, rule .069, 93 clarifies the distinction between a
motor vehicle, which is subject to the Motor Vehicle Sales and Use Tax,94
and moveable specialized equipment, which is taxed under the Limited
Sales, Excise and Use Tax provisions. 95 This rule, as are the first two rules,
is retroactive, having been made effective April 4, 1979. The rule defines
motor vehicle to mean a "self-propelled unit which may transport property
separate from itself or persons other than the driver upon the public high-
ways." 96 Various kinds of trailers are also included in this definition.97
The rule prevents the loss of a unit's identity as a motor vehicle by specifi-
cally providing that the addition to the vehicle of tangible personal prop-
piece of machinery, equipment, or property and, if attached, is
readily removable without substantial damage to the unit or to the
realty or without destroying the intended usefulness of the realty;
(2) the furnishing of tangible personal property if the person furnish-
ing the property is not responsible for the final affixation or instal-
lation of any of the property furnished; or
(3) the furnishing of tangible personal property if the person furnish-
ing the property is only responsible for supervision or warranty of
installation without contractual responsibility for installation.
88. See note 87 supra, subsections (a)(l)-(3).
89. See note 87 supra, subsections (b)(l)-(3).
90. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.068, 4 Tex. Reg. 929-30 (1979). Rule
.068 was subsequently amended to add a provision that addresses the taxability or non-
taxability of a motor vehicle that is produced by combining items of tangible personal prop-
erty. 4 Tex. Reg. 2143 (1979).
91. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.068(a)(4), 4 Tex. Reg. 930 (1979).
92. Id. Rule 026.02.20.068(a)(1).
93. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.069, 4 Tex. Reg. 930 (1979).
94. Id. Rule 026.02.20.069(a)(3).
95. Id. Rule 026.02.20.069(b)(2).
96. Id. Rule 026.02.20.069(a)(1).
97. Id.
19801
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
erty that allows the unit to perform a specialized function, but which also
prohibits the vehicle from transporting separate property or persons other
than the driver, will not cause the loss of its identity as a motor vehicle. 98
For example, the rule provides that a flat-bed truck upon which oil well
servicing equipment is attached retains its identity as a motor vehicle. 99
Moveable specialized equipment, on the other hand, is defined as "[a]
unit designed and built specifically to perform a specialized function which
does not include transporting property separate from itself or persons other
than the driver.''0° In December of 1979, the comptroller amended rule
.069 to provide clearer examples of moveable specialized equipment, in-
cluding motorized cranes, motorized oil well servicing units, and mobile
auto crushers.' 0 ' As noted above, these units are taxed under the limited
sales, excise and use tax provisions.
Administrative Decisions. The comptroller issued a substantial number of
administrative decisions in connection with sales and use taxes during this
survey period. In connection with the imposition of such taxes, these deci-
sions include holdings on the transfer of property in the form of a divi-
dend, 10 2 leased property,1°3 the rendering of custodial services for the
United States government, l4 and numerous other matters. 0 5 Several de-
cisions dealt with exemptions in connection with occasional sales, 10 6 ex-
98. Id. Rule 026.02.20.069(a)(2).
99. Id.
100. Id. Rule 026.02.20.069(b)(1).
101. Id., 4 Tex. Reg. 4536 (1979).
102. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8768 (1978) (transfer of airplane did not
constitute taxable sale where subsidiary corporation at special meeting of board of directors
declared airplane as a dividend to its parent corporation and then transferred possession
pursuant to this declaration).
103. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10193 (1979) (under art. 20.031 lessee
was liable for payment of use tax on lease payments where aircraft, which was leased from
out-of-state seller, was delivered to the lessee in Texas, hangared in state as home base, and
was used for 17 maintenance flights, for 3 intrastate flights, and for 100 interstate flights).
104. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10163 (1979) (in absence of contractual
provision reflecting that title had passed to United States government prior to use, materials
and supplies purchased and used by taxpayer in performance of custodial service contract
with government were subject to sales and use tax).
105. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8764 (1978) (coating of pipe constitutes
processing under art. 20.01(K)(2)(a) and is taxable as sale of tangible personal property);
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10293 (1979) (company engaged in spraying
weeds and grasses with chemicals was performing service and owed sales or use tax on
purchases of chemicals used for this service); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No.
10110 (1979) (making seat covers in accordance with a customer's special order constitutes
manufacturing or fabrication and is subject to sales and use tax); Comptroller's Administra-
tive Decision No. 9952 (1979) (where a vendor refused to submit records for audit in order
to establish his reported deductions from gross receipts, his total gross receipts were taxable
under the presumption in art. 20.021(F) "that all gross receipts are subject to the tax until the
contrary is established").
106. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8036 (1978) (sale of aircraft by out-of-
state seller was not occasional sale since seller was making more than two sales of tangible
personal property and would have been required to have sales and use permit if operating in
Texas); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8273 (1978) (for the purposes of the oc-
casional sale exemption in article 20.01 (F)(2), the phrase "expenses attributable to such 'sep-
arate division, branch or identifiable segment'" contemplates more than just the initial
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empt entities,10 7 resales, 10 8 property necessary to the manufacturing
expense of purchasing said division, branch or segment being sold); Comptroller's Adminis-
trative Decision No. 9269 (1978) (vendor holding sales tax permit in another state(s) could
not make an occasional sale under art. 20.02(F)(1)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision
No. 10206 (1979) (seller holding sales tax permit does not come within the terms of the
occasional sale definition in art. 20.01(F)(I) even though he makes only two or fewer sales of
tangible personal property durin a 12-month period); Comptroller's Administrative Deci-
sion No. 9670 (1978) (well servicing operator engaged in performing nontaxable service for
customers was responsible for paying tax on purchases of tangible personal property used in
servicing operations); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9406 (1978) (purchase of
tangible personal property from Texas vendor by out-of-state corporation that took posses-
sion of property in Texas was taxable sale under article 20.01(K)(a), even though title to
property passed to purchaser under sale contract after property was installed at location
outside of Texas); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8289 (1979) (making uniforms
for consideration constitutes processing of tangible personal property under art.
20.01(K)(2)(a), resulting in taxable sale for sales and use tax purposes); Comptroller's Ad-
ministrative Decision No. 7476 (1979) (purchases of electricity used for heating, cooling,
lighting, operation of office machines, and other administrative uses, are taxable unless (1)
electricity purchased flows through same meter as electricity that is purchased and used in
actual processing operations and (2) electricity purchased for, and used in, the actual
processing operations predominates over the electricity purchased for use in a taxable man-
ner); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9913 (1979) (overprinting of new address
or phone number on top of old one on letterhead, when done for consideration, constitutes
printing under art. 20.01(K)(2)(a) and is taxable sale for sales and use tax purposes); Comp-
troller's Administrative Decision No. 9367 (1979) (both charge for fabrication labor and
materials charge on customer's billing are included in sales price when tangible personal
property is made by vendor for customer and he separates two charges); Comptroller's Ad-
ministrative Decision No. 9524 (1979) (production of scale models for engineering compa-
nies, architects and other businesses, constitutes taxable sale for sales and use tax purposes
since production constitutes processing or manufacturing); Comptroller's Administrative
Decision No. 9472 (1979) (where contractor makes improvements to realty under lump-sum
contract, he is consumer of all materials used in performance of contract under article
20.01(T) and must pay sales and use tax on purchase price of materials); Comptroller's Ad-
ministrative Decision No. 9404 (1979) (where subsidiary transferred tangible personal prop-
erty to a parent corporation for consideration, transfer is not exempt under art. 20.04(v) and
is taxable for sales and use tax purposes, unless, before or after sale, purchasing company
owns joint or undivided interest with selling corporation in property transferred and can
show that sales and use tax has previously been paid on property); Comptroller's Adminis-
trative Decision No. 9987 (1979) (purchases used in performance of real estate improvement
contract that provided that the contractor would perform his obligations in exchange for
lump-sum amount covering both labor and materials and in which change order specified
lump-sum; contract was lump-sum contract within meaning of art. 20.01(T) and therefore
subject to sales and use tax even though section entitled "project recap" reflected separate
amounts for labor and materials); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10368 (1979)
(in absence of evidence establishing that sales and use tax was not due, where audit of com-
pany revealed that it had more taxable sales on records than it reported to comptroller,
additional sales were presumed taxable pursuant to arts. 20.021(F) and 20.03 1(F)); Comp-
troller's Administrative Decision No. 10354 (1979) (transaction was not exempt as occa-
sional sale where company sold operating assets of separate division of business, but did not
sell all operating assets of division, and under sale contract retained right to, and, in fact, did
replace some operating assets with property never used in division).
107. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10337 (1978) (purchases by governmen-
tal, religious, or eleemosynary entities as identified in art. 20.04(H) exempt from sales and
use tax; sales by entities, however, are subject to tax unless otherwise exempt under specific
provision of art. 20.04); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10579 (1979) (sales of
tangible personal property to employee of entity exempt from sales and use tax under art.
20.04(H) nonetheless taxable where exempt entity had no obligation to seller for payment of
purchase price and employee was not reselling purchased property to exempt entity); Comp-
troller's Administrative Decision No. 10445 (1979) (pursuant to enactment of art.
20.04(H)(7), purchases by organizations exempt from federal income tax under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) are exempt from sales and use tax effective Aug. 29, 1977, but not before); Comp-
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process, 10 9 and other categories. 10 Three holdings addressed the issue of a
troller's Administrative Decision No. 8426 (1979) (where vendor sold tangible personal
property, collecting tax from entity exempt on purchases under art. 20.04(H), vendor was
required to remit tax to state though sale was entitled to exemption from sales and use tax).
108. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8713 (1978) (resale certificate is required
to reflect sale or use tax permit number of vendor; however, exemption certificate is not
required to contain such number, but should cite basis for exemption of purchase); Comp-
troller's Administrative Decision No. 10371 (1979) (where purchaser of equipment provided
exemption certificate to seller reflecting equipment was purchased for farm use and also
furnished seller financial information indicating that purchaser was in business other than
farming, seller could accept certificate in good faith since purchaser's engagement in busi-
ness other than farming did not establish that purchaser would not be using equipment for
farm use); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8866 (1979) (sales tax is due on trans-
action in which purchaser buys property from Texas vendor (for resale purposes), takes
possession of property in Texas, and then transfers it outside Texas for use); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 10018 (1979) (where contractor improves realty of customer
under a lump-sum contract, it cannot accept resale certificate from customer for purchases it
uses in order to perform the improvements, since, under art. 20.01(T), contractor is con-
sumer of purchases and owes sales or use tax on them); Comptroller's Administrative Deci-
sion No. 9978 (1978) (sales tax permit number of purchaser is by itself insufficient to
establish that purchase is for resale under art. 20.02 1(F)); Comptroller's Administrative De-
cision No. 9678 (1979) (where exemption certificate given after sale by organization claiming
exempt status under art. 20.04(H) and comptroller had made previous determination that
organization did not qualify for exempt status under that article, seller could not accept
exemption certificate in good faith).
109. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9102 (1979) (taxpayer's purchase of
gloves used during electrostatic plating operation to protect hands of employees from toxic
materials was exempt from sales and use tax as property necessary to manufacturing process
and which had useful life of less than six months).
110. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9525 (1979) (taxpayer's purchases of
steel rods used to aid in the manufacturing of cast iron and having useful life of less than six
months were exempt from sales and use tax under art. 20.04(E)); Comptroller's Administra-
tive Decision No. 9102 (1979) (electrostatic plating constitutes processing and is thus taxable
as sale for sales and use tax purposes); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8750
(1978) (taxpayer who purchased scrap metal, crushed and cut metal into a product, then sold
product, was manufacturer or processor within meaning of art. 20.04(E)); Comptroller's Ad-
ministrative Decision No. 10380 (1979) (purchaser is not entitled to exemption from sales
and use tax under art. 20.04(B) where he takes delivery of advertising supplements instead of
having them sent directly to newspaper for distribution); Comptroller's Administrative Deci-
sion No. 8891 (1979) (chemicals purchased to remove impurities from press roller and plates
during printing process in order to create sharper printed images were necessary to the man-
ufacturing process and, therefore, exempt under art. 20.04(E)(l)(b)); Comptroller's Adminis-
trative Decision No. 9955 (1979) (providing equipment and an operator for a single charge
presumed to be service rather than rental of tangible personal property and sales and use tax
is not imposed upon the charge); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9791 (1979)
(taxpayer purchasing tangible personal property from a Texas vendor and who takes posses-
sion of property within Texas, owes sales tax even though taxpayer immediately removed
property from Texas); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9885 (1979) (purchase of
diving bell used outside Texas territorial limits to transport divers underwater to recover
blow-out preventers and marine risers dropped by drilling contractors, as well as to survey
ocean bottom to insure that proposed well location was suitable for installing blow-out pre-
venter, was not exempt under art. 20.04(X) and was subject to sales and use tax since bell
was not tangible personal property used directly in exploration or production, but rather a
transportation device only indirectly involved in exploration or production); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 8836 (1979) (taxpayer who purchased an aircraft for use as
certificated or licensed carrier of persons or property, but never improved aircraft to meet
FAA requirements to obtain certification, was subject to sales tax on the purchase price since
the aircraft was never used as a certificated or licensed carrier); Comptroller's Administra-
tive Decision No. 9806 (1979) (where coolant purchased was used by taxpayer in cooling
machines that cooled the taxpayer's manufactured product so that it could be wrapped,
purchases were exempt from sales or use tax under art. 20.04(E)(2) as property necessary
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successor's liability for the taxes,III while one required the remittance of
tax to the state even though it had been erroneously collected. 12 Finally,
the comptroller published decisions regarding the applicability of the use
tax to prizes awarded to contest winners, 1 3 a change in the use of an item
initially purchased for resale, 14 and other miscellaneous situations. 15
C. Legislative Developments
During the survey period, several statutes were amended in connection
with sales and use taxes, three of which concern local tax matters rather
than state matters. 1 6 In regard to state sales tax matters, the legislature
and essential to manufacturing process); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9890
(1979) (where certificated airline carrier purchased coffee makers, ovens, trays and bar carri-
ers for use on aircraft, purchases were subject to sales or use tax as supply items rather than
being exempt under art. 20.04(G)(3)(a) since not part of the aircraft); Comptroller's Admin-
istrative Decision No. 10011 (1979) (where corporation purchased nonstick polyethylene
film to cover products for purpose of transporting them to finished goods plant for further
processing, purchases were not exempt from sales and use tax as wrapping and packaging
material under art. 20.04(E)(2) since they did not further sale of product in its packaged
form); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10019 (1979) (where Texas corporation
purchased yacht outside of Texas without paying sales tax, then brought it into Texas waters
within five months from date of purchase and designated Texas as home port when register-
ing yacht, corporation owed use tax on purchase price since purchased for use in Texas).
I11. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10228 (1978) (where purchaser bought
delinquent taxpayer's business assets at foreclosure sale, he was not successor within mean-
ing of successor liability provisions under art. 20.09(I)); Comptroller's Administrative Deci-
sion No. 9324 (1979) (where purchaser bought business from owner, rather than from
taxpayer who had been operating business under lease from owner, and who had defaulted
on lease, purchaser was not successor within meaning of successor liability provisions under
art. 20.09(I)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10316 (1979) (under authority of
art. 20.09(I) purchaser cannot alter his statutory liability as successor for delinquent sales
and use taxes of seller by relying upon provision in sales contract that purchaser of business
will not be responsible for seller's debts).
112. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10050 (1978) (where retailer charges
and collects sales tax from purchaser, even though tax is not due on transactions involved,
he must remit tax to state under art. 1.07(2)).
113. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10322 (1978) (where company
purchased tangible personal property and gave it away to contest winners, company was
subject to sales and use tax on purchase price of property since giving it away constituted a
taxable use under arts. 20.031 and 20.04(E)(l)(b)(iv)).
114. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10043 (1979) (where corporation
purchased machine under resale certificate, but made divergent use of it by utilizing in re-
search and development, corporation was responsible for payment of use tax on purchase
price).
115. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10176 (1979) (where purchaser
purchased paintings from out-of-state vendors and brought into Texas for its own use,
purchase price was taxable since taxpayer was unable to rebut presumption in art. 20.031(L)
that tangible personal property purchased from vendor and then brought into Texas is pre-
sumed to have been purchased for storage, use, or consumption in state).
116. Effective June 13, 1979, the legislature amended art. 1066c to extend local use tax
liability to items brought or shipped directly into a local taxing jurisdiction, even though the
original sale was consummated outside of that local taxing jurisdiction. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1066c, § 4(E)-(F) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979). Nonetheless, a vendor
must have had a nexus with the taxing jurisdiction to which the goods are brought in order
to incur responsibility for collecting the tax. Id. art. 1066e, § (4)(C). The amendments also
define the "place of business of the retailer," listing various places at which a sale may be
consummated. Id. art. 1066c, § 6(B)(i). This amendment, however, is not effective until
Aug. 31, 1981. The amendments to article 1066c were enacted in response to two recent
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made significant changes in the Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act." 1 7
An addition to article 20.04 provides an exemption from sales and use
taxes for specialized equipment that is used to enable the deaf to commu-
nicate with an ordinary telephone. 1 8 All material, papers, and printing
ribbons used in the operation of the equipment are similarly exempt from
these taxes.' ' 9 Article 20.05 was amended to increase the interest rate on
taxes that are over sixty days delinquent from six percent to seven per-
cent.' 20 Article 20.08, relating to petitions for redetermination of tax, also
was amended to reflect the increase in interest rate for failure to pay taxes
within the statutory period. '21 Finally, article 20.11 relating to administra-
tion of the act was amended to eliminate the misdemeanor penalty for an
employee or official who discloses to the public certain information con-
cerning the taxpayer's business that was obtained from the taxpayer's re-
quired reports or an investigation of a taxpayer's business.' 22  The
amendatory language does, however, continue to provide that such infor-
mation is confidential and not open to public inspection.
cases, one of which was Dunigan Tool & Supply Co. v. Bullock, 588 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). For an in-depth discussion of the district court's opin-
ion in that case, see Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 582-85.
The other amendments dealing with local sales and use taxes address matters dealing with
rapid transit authorities. Art. II 18x, relating to the powers, duties and administration of the
Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authorities, was amended in several respects. First, the legisla-
ture provided four permissible rates of local sales and use tax, up to a maximum of one
percent, that could be levied by the board of a rapid transit authority. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. I I 18x, § lIB (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979) (effective Sept. I, 1979). Secondly,
the legislature extended a rapid transit authority's power to assess a use tax to items brought
or shipped directly into the authority's geographical area, even though the original sale was
consummated outside of the authority's jurisdiction. Id. art. 11 18x, § I lB (C)(4)-(5) (effec-
tive June 13, 1979). This extension of authority to assess use tax is identical to the extension
granted localities by the amendment to art. 1066c, and similarly, art. 11 18x provides that a
vendor must have a nexus with the taxing authority to which the goods are brought in order
to incur responsibility for collecting the tax. Id. art. I 18x, § I IB(C)(3). Finally, art. 11 18x
has been amended to provide a procedure for allowing certain incorporated cities or towns
to draw from a rapid transit authority. Id. art. 11 18x, § 6D (effective Aug. 22, 1979). The
legislature also enacted an entirely new article, art. l 18y, which permits the creation of
regional transportation authorities. The article also addresses the authority's organization,
management, powers and duties, as well as the methods by which the authority may be
financed. Id. art. !1 18y (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979) (effective Aug. 27, 1979). Similar
to the statutory taxing powers of metropolitan transit authorities, art. I I 18y provides (I)
permissible sales and use tax rates that the regional authorities may assess, id., art. II 18y,
§ 16(a), (2) taxing authority on tangible personal property purchased outside of but brought
into their geographical areas, id. art. 11 18y, §§ 16(f)(2)(D)-(E), and (3) a vendor must have a
nexus with the regional taxing authority to which the goods are brought in order to incur
responsibility for collecting the tax, id. art. I I 18y, § 16(f)(2)(C).
117. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. arts. 20.01-.17 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1980).
118. Id. art. 20.04(M)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (effective Aug. 27, 1979).
119. Id.
120. Id. art. 20.05(H) (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
121. Id. art. 20.08(G) (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
122. Id. art. 20.11(G)(I) (effective June 13, 1979).
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III. AD VALOREM TAXES
A. Cases
During this survey period more court opinions dealt with ad valorem
taxes than with any other area of state taxation. Many of these cases in-
volved taxpayers seeking injunctive relief against such activities as the col-
lection of taxes under allegedly discriminatory and illegal plans of taxation
and improper evaluation and reassessment procedures. Additionally, a
number of cases dealt with exemptions from ad valorem taxes123 and pro-
cedural aspects of litigation pertaining to ad valorem taxes.' 24 Other cases
dealt with miscellaneous matters such as the validity of a tax ordinance, 125
the taxable situs of property, 126 and the payment of court costs by tax au-
thorities. 127
Injunctive Relief The majority of taxpayers seeking injunctive relief al-
leged that the tax authorities were proceeding under a discriminatory and
illegal plan of taxation. In Crystal City Independent School District v. Grf-
fith- Williams Cattle Co.' 28 the San Antonio court of civil appeals held that
a plan of taxation of real property for ad valorem tax purposes as author-
123. Davies v. Meyer, 573 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ)
(bishop's land used as church campground was not exempt from ad valorem taxes under
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150-2a since evidence did not establish that property was
used exclusively for threefold purpose of religious, educational, and physical development
of young people).
124. Rhodes v. City of Austin, 584 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (where actions or suits are brought for collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes, TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7345b-1 provides for venue in county in which taxes are levied
and plea of privilege regarding such a proceeding will not lie under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1995); Commerce Independent School Dist. v. Hampton, 577 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ) (failure to serve attorney general with notice of proceed-
ing in suit where tax ordinance allegedly violated Texas Constitution deprived trial court of
jurisdiction to rule on validity of ordinance); State v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 575 S.W.2d
602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ dism'd) (where neither state nor county seizes or
levies upon taxpayer's personal property, county court's jurisdiction is determined by
amount of debt owed in connection with such property rather than value of property that is
assessed); Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Sealy Independent School Dist., 572 S.W.2d 49
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ) (trial court's failure to file findings of
fact on which legal conclusion was based was error where appellant made timely request to
file such findings).
125. Commerce Independent School Dist. v. Hamptoo, 577 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1979, no writ); see note 124 supra.
126. County of Dallas v. Yellow Cab of Dallas, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1978, writ retd n.r.e.) (summary judgment precluded where there was a material
issue of fact whether taxicabs had acquired taxable situs separate from tax situs of com-
pany).
127. El Campo Independent School Dist. v. Kimmey, 571 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. 1978)
(school districts are exempt under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 7297, 7343 from liability
for costs in a collection suit for taxes); State v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 575 S.W.2d 602,
605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ dism'd) (state and county not liable for costs in suit
for collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes); City of Corpus Christi v. Davis, 575 S.W.2d
46, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (taxing authorities, including the city,
independent school district, and junior college district of Corpus Christi, are exempt from
payment of any court costs in suit to recover delinquent taxes); County of Dallas v. Yellow
Cab of Dallas, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.) (tax
authorities are exempt from payment of court costs even though claim for delinquent ad
valorem taxes arises by way of cross claim).
128. 575 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ized by that district's board of trustees was invalid and void as to the tax-
payers. The taxpayers alleged that the school district's levy of taxes
assessed by the board of equalization was invalid because the levy had not
been made in accordance with the formalities required by law. Texas law
requires that such a levy be made by ordinance rather than by motion or
resolution. 129 The trustees, however, had levied the tax by resolution, sub-
sequently arguing that the resolution qualified as an ordinance since it was
vested with the "formalities, solemnities and characteristics of an ordi-
nance."' 130 The court disagreed with the trustees. The mere fact that the
levy was made by resolution, however, did not cause it to be invalid. The
court stated that it would have been valid had the minutes of the meeting
indicated that the resolution had been acted on or passed by the board,
signed by any member of the board, corresponded to or bore any relation-
ship to the minutes, or stated the purposes for which it was levied. '3, The
minutes, however, failed to reflect even the amount of the tax, the purpose
for which it was levied, or whether a vote was ever taken on the tax rate.
Because of the absence of minimal formalities, the levy was declared inva-
lid and void as to the taxpayers. 132 This case highlights the importance of
advising taxing authorities of the formal requirements necessary to prop-
erly authorize a plan of taxation.
In Anderson County Taxpayer's League v. City of Palestine 33 the Tyler
court of civil appeals held that a plan of taxation was discriminatory and
illegal since it violated the constitution and statutes of Texas by denying
the taxpayers the equal protection of these laws. A deliberate decision by
the taxing authorities to exclude all personal property from the tax rolls
violated article VIII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, which requires
equal and uniform taxation. 134 By establishing this violation of Texas law,
129. E.g., Mercedes Independent School Dist. v. Nolen, 536 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Flower Grove Independent School Dist. v. Koger, 77
S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1934, writ dism'd).
130. 575 S.W.2d at 338.
131. Id. at 339.
132. Id. Note that although the taxpayers established that the plan was illegal because of
the lack of formalities, the court did not require that they establish probable injury in order
to obtain an injunction. Cf. Commissioner's Court v. Calhoon, 575 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, no writ), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 150-56, which re-
quired such showings before a temporary injunction could be granted.
133. 576 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
134. Id. at 683. The Tyler court had reached a similar conclusion in an earlier case
involving a deliberate decision to exclude certain personal property from assessment. Hutt
v. City of Rocksprings, 552 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The testimony of taxing authorities in Anderson indicated only the absence of an effort to
place personal property on the tax rolls rather than a deliberate decision to exclude such
items. In addition, one member of the city's Board of Equalization testified that he was
unaware of the necessity for placing this property on the tax rolls. The court held, however,
that the facts established a "scheme, or plan, wilfully followed." 576 S.W.2d at 683. The
court concluded that "[i]t is not necessary that the taxing officials intend specifically to dis-
criminate against or injure [taxpayers]. It is sufficient that by their action they [deny taxpay-
ers] the equal protection of the Constitution and laws of this state." Id. Perhaps the court is
indicating that taxing authorities within its jurisdiction must take affirmative action to insure
the adoption of a nondiscriminatory plan of taxation, and that even an unconsidered omis-
sion can constitute a "deliberate decision" for purposes of determining whether a plan of
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the taxpayers met the first half of the burden of proof required for an in-
junction since they established a probable right to relief on a trial on the
merits of their case. The taxpayers were unable, however, to establish the
second part of their burden of proof that probable substantial injury would
result to them if the illegal plan of taxation were implemented. This injury
must be pecuniary, rather than a mere deprivation of constitutional
rights.' 35 Specifically, the taxpayers should have shown that the plan
would result in payment by them of more than their fair share of the
taxes. 136 Since no showing of probable injury to the taxpayers was made,
the court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the application
for a temporary injunction.
During an earlier part of the survey period, the Tyler court granted a
temporary injunction in Burklund v. Hackett. 137 Taxpayers sought to en-
join the defendants from placing proposed values for the taxpayers' prop-
erty on the tax rolls and approving the rolls, as well as from levying or
attempting to collect taxes based upon these values. The taxpayers alleged
that the defendants intended to apply an unconstitutional plan of taxation
to their property, and that implementation of the plan would result in im-
mediate, irreparable, and substantial injury to them. Upon appeal from an
interlocutory order granting the temporary injunction, the court stressed
the limited standard of appellate review applicable under these circum-
stances. The sole question in connection with such a review was whether
the trial court's action constituted a clear abuse of discretion.' 38
The defendants' first point of error stated that the court had erred in
granting the injunction since the defendants had not announced which val-
ues would be placed on the taxpayers' land for tax purposes or when the
Board of Equalization would adjourn. Thus, the defendants argued, the
trial court's conclusion that the taxpayers were entitled to a preservation of
the status quo was based upon pure speculation; the taxpayers had simply
filed their suit too early. The defendants further argued that there was no
evidence establishing that the Board of Equalization would have approved
the submission of the appraised values by the tax assessor, certified the tax
rolls, and adjourned before the taxpayers could institute a suit for injunc-
taxation is illegal. This approach certainly appears to be reasonable because illegality, or
discrimination against taxpayers, should rest upon an examination of the equality and uni-
formity with which property is taxed, as opposed to an examination of the intent of the
taxing authority.
135. 576 S.W.2d at 685.
136. The court required the taxpayers to make only a showing that more than their "fair
share" of taxes would be paid in order for them to establish probable substantial injury. In
Hutt v. City of Rocksprings, 552 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ refd n.r.e.),
however, the Tyler court described a more specific standard that must be met. The court in
Hut held that a taxpayer must "prove that because of the illegal plan his taxes are excessive
or substantially higher than they would have been had the plan followed the proper statu-
tory and constitutional guidelines." Id. at 586. Although Hutt was not cited in Anderson for
this proposition, presumably the court intended that the earlier standard, or a similar test,
provide a method for determining whether a taxpayer would pay more than his fair share.
137. 575 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
138. Id. at 391.
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tive relief.' 39 The court of appeals disagreed, however, noting that while
past acts and practices of the defendants would not furnish a basis for
injunctive relief in the absence of a showing that they would probably re-
cur, the evidence presented established that the defendants were likely to
follow their previous course of conduct and fully implement their plan of
taxation before the taxpayers could obtain injunctive relief.' 40
An important factor in the court's reliance upon the probable recurrence
of past practices was that the defendants had deliberately placed the tax-
payers in an untenable position by refusing to inform them of when the
board would adjourn or whether an opportunity to file suit would be af-
forded. Had the taxpayers awaited the board's disposition of their case,
the tax plan might have been put into effect, thus eliminating the availabil-
ity of a preliminary injunction and burdening the taxpayers with the more
onerous requirement of proving the excessiveness of taxes. 141 On the other
hand, because of the defendants' refusal to provide necessary information,
the taxpayers were faced with the dilemma that their suit might be prema-
ture if filed before the plan was put into effect. This refusal of the defend-
ants to communicate appears to have caused the court to rely upon past
practices in disregarding the premature timing of the suit. 142
Since the taxpayers would have suffered a tremendous increase in the
burden of proof had they waited to seek relief until after the fundamen-
tally erroneous plan was put into effect, the court held that their diligent
prosecution of the constitutional challenge was all that was required. 43
Even though the defendants had not, in fact, made any determination re-
garding the values to be placed upon the taxpayer's land, the court con-
cluded that the taxing scheme was arbitrary and unconstitutional because
the appraisal and assessment of property was based upon a system of five
categories of value ranges, rather than upon the fair market value of the
property. 144 The taxpayers established that the application of a uniform
and equal system of taxation based upon fair market value would reduce
their estimated tax burden by more than $4,000. Thus, they established
evidence of probable injury that was required to support the issuance of
the temporary injunction.
Burklund is significant because it indicates that taxpayers need not wait
for a final determination regarding the valuation of their land before they
seek a temporary injunction. If they can establish that past acts and prac-
tices of the taxing authority indicate that such values probably will be de-
termined and adopted, adversely affecting their estimated tax burden, then
they may seek a temporary injunction with its lighter burden of proof
139. Id.
140. Id. at 392.
141. Following the implementation of a fundamentally erroneous plan of taxation, tax-
payers may no longer obtain a temporary injunction to defeat the plan. They may defeat the
recovery of taxes, but only to the extent that the taxes and valuations are excessive. Id. at
391-92.
142. Id. at 393.
143. Id. at 392-93.
144. Id. at 394.
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rather than waiting for the adoption of a fundamentally erroneous plan of
taxation and incurring a heavier burden of proof.
Three other cases during the survey period involved suits for injunction
based upon allegations of improper valuation of property. In Texas East-
ern Transmission Corp. v. Sealy Independent School District'4 5 the Houston
(1st District) court of civil appeals held that the Board of Equalization had
not engaged in an arbitrary and fundamentally erroneous valuation of the
taxpayers' natural gas pipeline because it had determined the fair market
value of this property from the testimony of expert witnesses based upon
recognized appraisal procedures. The taxpayer had sought an injunction
to prevent the district from imposing and collecting ad valorem taxes for
1977 on the basis of valuations set by the Board of Equalization. Although
the taxpayer had submitted the value of its pipeline as $192,764, the board
rejected this value, relying instead upon a figure provided by an appraisal
firm establishing that the value was $511,310. The appraiser had com-
bined the cost approach value and the income approach value in determin-
ing an average cost per mile for the pipeline. 46 The appraiser failed,
however, to take into account the impact that Federal Power Commission
regulations could have on the future income-producing capacity of the
pipeline.
The taxpayer's burden of proof required that it establish that the board
had adopted an illegal, arbitrary, and fundamentally erroneous plan of
valuation, or placed a grossly excessive valuation on the property.147 The
court concluded that the appraiser's income approach was an erroneous
method of valuation since he had failed to consider the impact of the Fed-
eral Power Commission's rules and regulations on future income. 148 The
exclusion of the appraiser's valuation left insufficient evidence to support
the trial court's determination of fair market value. In the absence of such
a determination, the court could not determine whether the valuation
placed on the pipeline by the Board of Equalization was grossly excessive.
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.149 This case provides sup-
port for other taxpayers attempting to reduce the assessed value of their
property as a result of the negative impact that restrictive agency regula-
tions may have upon potential purchasers.
The Tyler court of civil appeals, in another suit for injunction based
upon an alleged improper valuation of property, dissolved a permanent
injunction granted against the commissioner's court and other officials of
145. 580 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
146. Id. at 598-99. The cost and income approaches upon which the appraiser relied had
been approved as permissible methods earlier by the Supreme Court of Texas in Polk
County v. Tenneco, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1977).
147. 580 S.W.2d at 603. To show that the valuation was grossly excessive, the taxpayer
had to establish that the assessed value was "so far above the fair cash market value as to
shock a correct mind and thereby raise a presumption that the valuation was fraudulent or
does not represent a fair and conscientious effort on the part of the board to arrive at the fair
cash market value." Id. at 604.




Anderson County. In Commissioner's Court v. Calhoon'50 the taxpayer
sought to enjoin an allegedly unlawful plan of taxation that was arbitrary
and discriminatory and would result in substantial injury to taxpayers
whose property consisted primarily of improved residential property. The
proposed plan of taxation would value all rural unimproved property at
$48 per acre, which equaled approximately one-sixth of its market value,
and would value improved property at its fair market value. The taxpayer,
who owned primarily improved property, argued that if the plan was im-
plemented, he would be substantially injured because his residence would
carry at last three times the tax burden as would unimproved property of
equal value. 5' While the defendants did not dispute the arbitrary and
illegal nature of the plan, they asserted that injunctive relief was unavaila-
ble since there was no evidence that it would cause substantial injury to the
taxpayer.
Although the court acknowledged that the plan was arbitrary and ille-
gal, it concluded that the taxpayer had to show "that the plan would dis-
criminate against him by deliberately causing his property to be assessed at
a greater percentage of its true value than the percentage assessed for other
properties subject to the tax."' 52 To meet this standard the court held that
the taxpayer must produce evidence showing the fair market value of all
property he owned that was subject to the discriminatory plan. ' 53 The tax-
150. 575 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
151. Id. at 73-74.
152. Id. at 75.
153. Although the court required the actual market value of all of the plaintiff's property,
the cases cited for this proposition do not clearly establish that the value of all classes of the
taxpayer's property must be presented. In Montgomery County v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
245 S.W.2d 326, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Beaumont court
of civil appeals stated that a showing of property tax valuations based upon different per-
centages for mineral property and nonmineral property was not sufficient to justify injunc-
tive relief. To show substantial injury, the court required the taxpayer to present "some
evidence" of the market value of its mineral property in Montgomery County to establish
that the assessed value of the mineral property exceeded the fair market value by at least
10%, which was the assessment rate for all nonmineral property. Id. at 334-35. There is no
clear indication in the court's opinion that the taxpayer had the burden of establishing the
fair market value of its nonmineral property. The court merely stated that "there is ade-
quate proof in the record that the nonmineral property was all assessed at approximately
one-tenth of its true market value." Id. at 335. The court does not state who produced the
proof or who was required to prove the fair market value of the nonmineral property. Mont-
gomery County, therefore, does not appear to be strong authority for the proposition that a
taxpayer is required to present proof of the fair market value of all classes of property when
he is attacking a plan on the ground of inequality of assessment.
In State v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 265 S.W.2d 569 (1954), the taxpayer claimed that
the court adopted an arbitrary plan of taxation by valuing the taxpayer's interest in a limited
oil payment and an unlimited royalty at substantially equal nharket values. Citing Mont-
gomery County, the court held that the taxpayer was required to produce evidence establish-
ing the market value of both interests since the board may have grossly undervalued the
unlimited royalty interest, which would have benefitted the taxpayer rather than injured
him. Id. at 213, 265 S.W.2d at 575. In Calhoon, however, the taxpayer was not complaining
of unequal assessments as to classes of his property, but was complaining of unequal assess-
ments as to his improved property in comparison to all other unimproved property in the
county. The evidence in Calhoon showed that all unimproved property in the county had a
minimum fair market value between $250.00 and $325.00 per acre. 575 S.W.2d at 75. In
Whittenburg the supreme court stated that "to prevail on the basis of unlawful discrimina-
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payer in Ca/hoon had introduced evidence showing the fair market value
of his residence, but failed to produce evidence concerning the fair market
value of other improved and unimproved property that he owned within
the county.' 54 The court concluded that this lack of evidence precluded a
determination of whether the taxpayer had paid more than his fair share of
taxes. 155 Accordingly, the court of civil appeals reversed the trial court,
dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the action. 56
In Parker v. Board of Trustees 157 a taxpayer challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory a reappraisal plan by which the fair market value of all
properties within the county were to be redetermined on a district-by-dis-
trict basis. The different areas of each district were reevaluated by an ap-
praisal firm at varying times, but no property was to be reevaluated again
until the completion of the initial reevaluation of all property in a given
district. The taxpayer sought an injunction against the collection of taxes,
arguing that his tax burden exceeded that of taxpayers whose property
would not be reappraised until a year or more after the reevaluation of his
own property. Although the court agreed that taxation should be equal
and uniform, it noted that exact evaluation cannot be achieved. 58 There-
fore, unless the taxpayer could establish that the plan was arbitrary and
illegal, and that he would be substantially injured by it, the court would
not enjoin the collection of taxes. Since the taxpayer failed to provide suf-
ficient evidence establishing either requirement, the court denied the in-
junction. As was the case in Calhoon, the court here stated that proof of
the fair market value of all of the plaintiffs property was necessary in or-
der to establish substantial injury.' 59
Reimbursementfor Payment of Taxes. In Henry S Miller Co. Y. Wood 60
the trial court held the defaulting purchasers of land must reimburse the
seller for delinquent ad valorem taxes assessed prior to default and paid by
the seller after he had recovered the land through foreclosure. The de-
fendants appealed the trial court's decision and obtained a reversal. The
tion it is not necessary that the taxpayer make a comparative showing with all other property
in the county,. . . but he must make at least a reasonable showing in that respect." 153 Tex.
210, 265 S.W.2d at 573. In Calhoon the evidence presented concerning unimproved prop-
erty appears to come well within the Whittenburg standard.
Finally, the last case cited to support the requirement that the value of all property must
be established involved taxpayers who owned property in one class, and sought an injunc-
tion to restrain the city and school district from raising the value of property in that class
without a corresponding revaluation of other property. Lancaster Independent School Dist.
v. Pinson, 510 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.). Thus, at best
Pinson provides only limited support for the statement that a taxpayer owning property in
more than one class must establish the value of all property in each class.
154. 575 S.W.2d at 75-76.
155. Id. at 76.
156. Id.
157. 584 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
158. Id. at 571. See also Darby v. Borger Independent School Dist., 386 S.W.2d 572
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
159. 584 S.W.2d at 572; see discussion in note 153 supra.
160. 584 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ granted).
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defendants argued on appeal that they were not personally liable for the
taxes paid because the deeds of trust and notes executed in conjunction
with the purchase expressly provided that the makers of the note had no
personal liability on the note in the event of default. The court agreed,
concluding that the amount paid for taxes became a part of the lien on the
land. The court relied on early Texas cases holding that a mortgagee in
such circumstances is entitled to be subrogated to the lien created by the
assessment of taxes, as well as to be reimbursed, but that the mortgagee
could only enforce his tax lien as a part of the mortgage debt. 16 There-
fore, if a personal judgment were not obtained against the mortgagors at
the time of the foreclosure, no right to reimbursement would exist after-
wards due to the discharge of the debt.
Even if the deed of trust and underlying note had not expressly provided
against personal liability, the Texarkana court of civil appeals might well
have reached the same result. The court stated that it "appears to be the
rule in Texas that one who forecloses under a deed of trust is not entitled
to a personal judgment against a mortgagor for taxes paid by the mortga-
gee either before or after foreclosure under a deed of trust."'
162
The Dallas court of civil appeals considered a similar issue a month
after the Wood case. In Smart v. Tower Land & Investment Co. 163 the
court affirmed the trial court's judgment granting reimbursement for taxes
paid by a vendor. To prevent foreclosure by the taxing authorities, the
plaintiff had paid delinquent ad valorem taxes after repurchasing the land
at a trustee's sale due to the defendant's default. Following payment of the
taxes, the plaintiff brought suit for reimbursement. Although the defend-
ant argued that he was not personally liable for payment of the taxes under
the language of the contract, the court disagreed, quoting a provision from
the promissory note by which he had agreed "to pay and discharge as they
are or may become payable all and every taxes and assessments that are or
may become payable."'' 64 The court distinguished the Wood case on the
ground that the note in Wood provided that the holder had the right to pay
taxes, and any sums so expended would become a part of the debt. In
Smart, however, the covenant between the parties did not provide that
payment of taxes by the mortgagee would become merged with the secured
debt. To the contrary, the covenant in Smart was held to create a separate
right of action for reimbursement. 65 The Dallas court distinguished the
cases relied upon in Wood, noting that in the case at bar the mortgagee
had not voluntarily paid the debt of another without his consent, as had
occurred in the cases distinguished.
Both Smart and Wood highlight the importance of carefully phrasing
161. Stone v. Tilley, 100 Tex. 487, 489, 101 S.W. 201, 201 (1907); The Praetorians v.
State, 53 S.W.2d 334, 334-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932, writ refd); Wood v. Scott, 48
S.W.2d 1024, 1025 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932, writ refd).
162. 584 S.W.2d at 305.
163. 582 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ granted).




the terms of contracts, deeds of trust, or promissory notes executed in con-
nection with a purchase of land. The Wood case states a rather broad rule
that a party who forecloses under a deed of trust is not entitled to a per-
sonal judgment against the mortgagor for reimbursement of taxes paid by
the mortgagee either before or after such foreclosure. This holding ap-
pears to have been narrowed by the Dallas court's opinion in Smart that a
separate right of reimbursement can, in fact, be created under the terms of
a promissory note that expressly provides for repayment. Thus, taxpayers
would be well advised to specify clearly the extent to which they can seek
reimbursement of payments made in connection with property purchased.
The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ in both Wood and Smart.166
In Smart the court specifically granted review of defendant's point five,
which contends that as a matter of law the plaintiffs only recourse under
the contract was against the property and not the defendant personally. 167
In Wood the court specifically granted plaintiffs point two, which con-
tends that the Texarkana court erred in construing the contractual provi-
sions that provided against personal liability to include nonliability as to
taxes, and since the plaintiff was contractually authorized to pay the taxes,
the amount paid became a demand obligation collectible under the deed of
trust or as otherwise provided by law.168 Although both points address the
interpretation of the controlling contracts, it appears that the supreme
court will at least have to address the validity of the broad rule announced
by the court in Wood. In any event, the decisions may provide some gui-
dance as to terms which should be included in the deed of trust and under-
lying note to insure reimbursement of taxes paid by the vendor of the
property.
IV. THE NEW PROPERTY TAX CODE
One of the most significant actions taken by the Texas Legislature dur-
ing this survey period was the enactment of the Property Tax Code. 169
This Code was enacted as a result of the approval by the voters on Novem-
ber 7, 1978, of the Tax Relief Amendment to the Texas Constitution. The
constitutional amendment requires all real and tangible property to be
taxed according to its value and authorizes the legislature to provide for
the taxation of intangible personal property. 170
Prior to the enactment of the new Code, implementing legislation was
passed in order to put into effect the provisions of the Tax Relief Amend-
ment. Article 7174A, for example, provides that agricultural land is to be
valued on the basis of certain factors relative to agricultural use. 17 Simi-
166. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 38 (Oct. 27, 1979).
167. Id. at 41.
168. Id.
169. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 1.01 to 43.03 (Vernon Pam. 1979) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Code].
170. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § I.
171. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7174A (Vernon Supp. 1980) basically provides for
the taxation of open-space land used for agricultural purposes "to the degree of intensity
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lar provisions were passed in connection with the valuation of qualified
timberland 172 and the exemption from ad valorem taxation of certain in-
generally accepted in the area and that has been devoted principally to agricultural use for
at least five of the preceding seven years." Id. art. 7174A, § 1(1). The agricultural activities
for which the land must be used include, but are not limited to,
cultivating the soil, producing crops for human food, animal feed, planting
seed, and for the production of fibers; floriculture, viticulture, and horticul-
ture; raising or keeping livestock; and planting cover crops or leaving land idle
for the purpose of participating in any governmental program, or normal crop
or livestock rotation procedure.
Id. art. 7174A, § 1(2). In addition to agricultural land, art. 7174A also qualifies land that is
used principally for ecological laboratories by colleges and universities. Id. art. 7174A,
§ 1(1). Open-space land is valued by the tax assessor for the taxing unit on the basis of the
category in which the land is principally used, applying accepted income capitalization
methods to the average annual net income that would have been derived from the land over
the preceding five years by a person using ordinary prudence in managing the land. Id. art.
7174A, § 2(a). This value must not exceed the fair market value as determined by other
generally accepted valuation methods. d.
In order to obtain appraisal for land under this special valuation method, a valid applica-
tion must be filed with the tax assessor for each taxing unit in which the land is taxable. Id.
art. 7174A, § 4(a). Land is ineligible for designation as qualified open-space land if the land
is (i) not within certain exceptions provided for land located inside the corporate limits of an
incorporated city or town, (2) owned by certain nonresident aliens or foreign governments,
or (3) owned by corporations, partnerships, trusts, or other business entities that must regis-
ter their ownership or acquisition of the land under federal law and a nonresident alien or
foreign government owns a majority interest in the entity. Id. art. 7174A, § 6.
Except for a few minor changes, the Code adopts art. 7174A. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN.
§§ 23.51-.57 (Vernon Pam. 1979) (effective Jan. 1, 1982). Note that a taxpayer seeking to
have his property appraised under § 23.51 must file a valid application before April I in the
year for which special appraisal is sought. Id. § 23.54(d).
172. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7174B (Vernon Supp. 1980). The value for ad
valorem tax purposes of property that qualifies for appraisal under this section is determined
on the basis of the category of the land, applying accepted income capitalization methods to
the average annual net income that would have been earned from the land over the preced-
ing five years if managed by a person using ordinary management prudence. Id. art. 7174B,
§ 3(a). This method is similar to that used for assessing qualified agricultural land. Property
qualifies for appraisal under this article
if, with the intent to produce income, it is currently and actively devoted prin-
cipally to production of timber or forest products to the degree of intensity
generally accepted in the area and has been devoted principally to production
of timber or forest products for at least five of the proceeding seven years.
Id. art. 7174B, § 2. If the use of land that has been appraised under this section later
changes, an additional tax is imposed on the property. Id. art. 717413, § 6(a). Land is ineli-
gible for productivity appraisal if it is (1) located inside the corporate limits of an incorpo-
rated city or town, with certain exceptions, (2) land owned by certain nonresident aliens or
foreign governments, or (3) land owned by corporations, partnerships, trusts, or other legal
entities if they are required by federal law to register their ownership or acquisition of the
land and if nonresident aliens or foreign governments own a majority interest in the entity.
Id. art. 7174B, § 7.
The Property Tax Code adopts the basic provisions of art. 7174B, but does make certain
clarifications. TEX. PROP. TAX. CODE ANN. §§ 23.71-78 (Vernon Pam. 1979) (effective Jan.
1, 1982). For example, art. 7174B does not make clear whether the requirement of intent to
produce income applies to both the current use of the land and the past use of the land for
five of the preceding seven years, or if it merely applies to the former. Section 23.72 of the
Code makes clear, however, that the intent to produce income relates only to the current use
of the property. The Code carries over the minimum appraisal requirement for timber land
that is contained in art. 7174B. That requirement basically provides that the value of such
property may not be less than the appraised value of the land for the 1978 tax year. TEX.
PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.78 (Vernon Pam. 1979). The value used for any tax year, how-
ever, may not exceed the fair market value of the land as determined by other generally
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tangible property. 73 Some provisions of the implementing legislation
have already been repealed by the Property Tax Code, 17 4 but others re-
main in effect until January 1, 1982.175 This survey article will deal prima-
rily with the new provisions regarding exemptions. 76 Some definitions
that will be effective in 1982 will also be discussed to make clear the
changes that will come about under the Code.
Of considerable significance, however, is the fact that the Code's defini-
tions necessary for proper interpretation of the exemptions do not become
effective until January 1, 1982, while the exemptions became effective Jan-
uary 1, 1980. This produces a dilemma, because many of the Code's defi-
nitions vary from prior law. Courts, attorneys, and individuals are
therefore faced with the current problem of determining whether the
Code's exemptions should be interpreted by utilizing prior statutory defini-
tions or by giving immediate effect to the definitions supplied by the Code.
Since the use of prior definitions would not promote the legislative intent
behind the Code, it is strongly suggested that the courts give effect to the
new definitions of words that are used in the sections of the Code that
became effective January 1, 1980, and utilize currently effective definitions
when interpreting provisions of present law that are not repealed until Jan-
uary 1, 1982.
The Code's definition of real property, while in many ways similar to
the present definition, 177 describes real property as including:
(A) land;
(B) an improvement;
(C) a mine or quarry;
(D) a mineral in place;
accepted methods of appraisal. Id. As is the case with the application for valuation as
qualified agricultural land, a taxpayer seeking to have his property appraised under the
provision dealing with timber land must file an application before April 1 of the year for
which the special appraisal is sought. Id. § 23.75.
173. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 302, art. 3, § 1, at 686 (art. 7150.6).
174. Id. (article 7150.6 exemption for intangible property); id. ch. 302, art. 4, § I, at 687
(art. 7150.2 exemption for household goods and personal effects); id. ch. 302, art. 5, §§ 1-4, at
688-89 (art. 7150.3 exemption for automobiles); id. ch. 302, art. 6, § 1, at 689 (art. 7150.4
defining residence homestead); id. ch. 302, art. 7, §§ 1-8, at 690-92 (art. 7150.5 exemption for
residence homestead).
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 7174A, 7174B (Vernon Supp. 1980).
176. The following articles dealing with exemptions have been repealed effective Jan. 1,
1980, due to the enactment of the Code: art. 7150 (miscellaneous exemptions from taxation);
art. 7150.2 (exemption of household goods and personal effects); art. 7150.3 (exemption for
automobiles); art. 7150.4 (defining residence homestead); art. 7150.5 (exemption for resi-
dence homesteads); art. 7150.6 (exemption for intangible property); art. 7150b (exemption of
property owned by church for minister's residence); art. 7150c (university lands subject to
tax for county purposes); art. 7150d (exemption of headquarter buildings of Texas Congress
of Parents and Teachers); art. 7150e (exemption of property of the Girl Scouts of America);
art. 7150f (property moving in interstate commerce); art. 7150g (exemption of property of
nonprofit educational corporations maintaining theater schools); art. 7150h (exemption of
property of disabled and deceased veterans); Art. 7150i (exemption of historic sites). Many
of the exemptions granted by the now repealed articles have been carried over to the Prop-
erty Tax Code. See TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 11.11-.26 (Vernon Pam. 1979).
177. The definition of real property contained in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7146
(Vernon Supp. 1980) will remain in force until Jan. I, 1982.
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(E) standing timber; or
(F) an estate or interest, other than a mortgage or deed of trust cre-
ating a lien on property or an interest securing payment or per-
formance of an obligation, in a property enumerated in
Paragraphs (A) through (E) of this subdivision. 178
This definition alters the present definition for real property in three ways.
First, standing timber is now expressly defined as real property. 179 Sec-
ondly, a mortgage or deed of trust that creates a lien to secure a payment
or performance of an obligation is excluded from the definition of real
property. 180 The latter provision adopts a distinction, recognized by early
Texas cases, between a taxable interest in land and the interest of a lie-
nor.181 Finally, mobile homes are no longer specifically included in the
Code's definition of real property. They will remain taxable as real prop-
erty, however, since they are within the definition of improvements,' 8 2
178. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(2) (Vernon Pam. 1979) (effective Jan. 1, 1982).
179. Id. § 1.02(2)(E). The inclusion of standing timber in the definition of real property
raises an interesting question with regard to valuation of land that has valuable timber
standing upon it. Under TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 23.71-.78 (Vernon Pam. 1979)
(effective Jan. 1, 1982), which adopts the basic provisions of TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
7174B (Vernon Supp. 1980), certain land that has timber standing upon it may be valued
under a special appraisal method. See discussion at note 172 supra. Under the Code, land
qualifies for the special appraisal method provided it is "currently and actively devoted prin-
cipally to production of timber or forest products to the degree of intensity generally ac-
cepted in the area with intent to produce income and has been devoted principally to
production of timber or forest products for five of the preceding seven years." TEX. PROP.
TAX CODE ANN. § 23.72 (Vernon Pam. 1979). If the timber land qualifies under § 23.72, the
appraised value of the land may be determined on the basis of accepted income capitaliza-
tion methods applied to average net to land, and such appraised value may not exceed the
market value of the land as determined under other appraisal methods. Id. § 23.73(a).
Thus, special valuation will be made for the land of taxpayers whose property qualifies for
this appraisal, but how the standing timber on other land will be valued if it does not qualify
is unclear. If the property is qualified open-space land devoted principally to agricultural
use, then it will be valued in a manner similar to the method provided for timber land. Id.
§ 23.51. If the land has valuable timber upon it, but qualifies neither as qualified timber
land nor as agricultural land, it will presumably be appraised at its market value, as defined
in § 1.04(7), by using generally accepted appraisal techniques. Id. § 23.01.
In determining the fair market value of cut timber for purposes of computing gain or loss
on the sale of such timber under I.R.C. § 63 1, factors examined include: comparable sales
data, quality of timber, location and accessibility, and the value of the whole tree. See H. J.
Kane, Problems of the Timber Operator.- Capital Costs- Valuation of Standing Timber-Cut-
ting Rights, 19 N. Y. U. INST. FED. TAX. 1115, 1121 (1961). Although these factors relate to
cut timber rather than to standing timber, they may provide an idea of some factors to
examine in determining the value of the latter.
180. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.02(2)(F) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
181. See, e.g., State v. Quintana Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 179, 133 S.W.2d 112 (1939);
Prince Bros. Drilling Co. v. Fuhrman Petroleum Corp., 150 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1941, writ refd). The Code's exclusion of certain mortgages and deeds of trusts from
the definition of real property should not result in a decrease of tax revenues since these
cases indicated such property was not a taxable interest.
182. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(3) (Vernon Pam. 1979), defines improvement to
include:
(A) a building, structure, fixture or fence erected on or affixed to land; or
(B) a transportable structure that is designed to be occupied for residential or
business purposes, whether or not it is affixed to land, if the owner of the
structure owns the land on which it is located, unless the structure is




which are included in the Code's definition of real property.183
The Code also incorporates the intangible personal property definition
that was enacted under the implementing legislation. This property is de-
fined to include:
[A] claim, interest (other than an interest in tangible property), right,
or other thing that has value but cannot be seen, felt, weighed, mea-
sured, or otherwise perceived by the senses, although its existence may
be evidenced by a document. It includes a stock, bond, note or ac-
count receivable, franchise, license or permit, demand or time deposit,
certificate of deposit, share account, share certificate account, share
deposit account, insurance policy, annuity, pension, cause of action,
contract, and goodwill. 8 4
Section 11.02 of the Code provides that intangible personal property is not
taxable except as provided by subsection (b) of that section.
Intangible personal property that is taxable under subsection (b) consists
of stock in a banking corporation, intangible property of unincorporated
banks, intangible property of certain transportation businesses, and intan-
gible property of insurance companies and savings and loan associa-
tions.185 Although the intangible personal property of these businesses is
taxable unless exempt by law, the state must have jurisdiction to tax the
intangibles. 86 Under the Code, Texas will have jurisdiction to tax intangi-
ble personal property, other than stock in a banking corporation, if the
property is owned by a resident of Texas or is located here for business
purposes. 187 In addition, Texas has jurisdiction to tax the stock of a bank-
ing corporation that is incorporated in the state or of a national bank lo-
cated in Texas. 88
A question may arise as to how long a mobile home may be located at a particular place in
order to qualify as a temporary location. Article 7146(a) presently exempts those that are
located within the boundaries of an assessing unit for less than sixty days. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 7146(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980). It is unclear whether sixty days will continue
to be a guideline, or whether the legislature intended that "temporarily" should consist of a
time either less or more than sixty days.
183. Where the improvements on land are owned by a person other than the owner of
the land, the Code has provisions directing the manner in which the improvements will be
listed on the tax rolls. The Code requires improvements, which include mobile homes, to be
listed in the name of the owner of the improvement if such owner is not entitled to an
exemption under the Code. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.08(b) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
The Code otherwise permits the land and improvements to be listed in the name of the
owner, id. § 25.08(a), or, upon proper request, the land and improvements shall be listed
separately in the name of the owner of the land and the owner of the improvements. Id.
§§ 25.08(a), (c).
184. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(6) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
185. Id. § 11.02(b). Certain property of these entities is also taxable under current law.
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 7147, 7165 (Vernon 1960) (repealed by Code effective
Jan. 1, 1982); TEX. INS. CODE ANN., art. 4.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979); TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 11.09 (Vernon 1964).
186. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.02(c) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 11.02(d). Taxing authorities currently have jurisdiction to tax such property
owned by Texas residents or located in the state for business purposes. See TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 7147 (Vernon 1960); First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. City of Dallas,
167 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1943, writ ref'd).
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The Code also provides a new definition for market value, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1982.189 This definition will affect future determinations of the
values at which property is assessed for taxation. Section 26.02, effective
January 1, 1981, provides that property may no longer be assessed for tax-
ation on the basis of a percentage of its appraised value.190 All property
will be assessed on the basis of 100% of its appraised value.' 91 Since sec-
tion 23.01 of the Code provides that unless otherwise provided for all taxa-
ble property must be appraised at its market value, 192 the definition of
market value becomes significant in determining the appraised value upon
which the property must be assessed. The Code defines market value to
mean:
[T]he price at which a property would transfer for cash or its
equivalent under prevailing market conditions if:
(A) exposed for sale in the open market with a reasonable time for
the seller to find a purchaser;
(B) both the seller and the purchaser know of all the uses and
purposes to which the property is adapted and for which it is
capable of being used and of the enforceable restrictions on its
use; and
(C) both the seller and purchaser seek to maximize their gains and
neither is in a position to take advantage of the exigencies of
the other. 193
The reasonable time requirement will obviously preclude taxpayers from
using a depressed market price that resulted from a forced sale. Although
this is certainly a useful provision from the perspective of maximizing ad
valorem revenues, a question arises as to how the ideal market value re-
ferred to in the definition will be determined in the event of a forced sale.
Taxpayers who purchase property as a result of a forced sale, or who
otherwise fail to meet the requirements of the definition, may need to pro-
vide evidence of comparable sales in order to support a disputed "market
value." 19 4
The reasonable time requirement in the definition has its roots in the
present definition of "value" under article 7149.195 This article defines the
term "true and full value" as "the fair market value, in cash, at the place
where the property to which the term is applied shall be at the time of
assessment, being the price which could be obtained therefor at private
sale, and not at forced or auction sale."' 196 In enacting the Code the legis-
189. TEx. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(7) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
190. Id. § 26.02.
191. Id.
192. Id. § 23.01. In the past, assessments have generally averaged between 40% and 60%
of the actual value of the property. 1 TEX. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 20-321.
193. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(7) (Vernon Pam. 1979) (effective Jan. 1, 1982).
194. The market data or comparable sales approach was used in the following cases:
Fawcett v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 889 (1975); Whitehead v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 253 (1974); Spicer v. Commissioner 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 45 (1974); Adams v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 503 (1973).





lature has chosen to rely upon an open market standard, rather than a
private sales standard. Presumably, this will preclude reliance upon a
price set in a non-arms-length sale and will aid in establishing the value of
property under prevailing market conditions. Additionally, the pre-Code
requirement that value be determined at the situs of the property at the
time of assessment is not carried over into the Code's definition. 97
The second requirement of the Code's market value definition is that
both the seller and purchaser know all of the present and potential uses
and purposes of the property, as well as enforceable restrictions on its
use. 198 This is similar to the practice engaged in by the Internal Revenue
Service in determining the value of property to be included in a decedent's
estate under section 203 1(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.199 The Service
frequently measures the use in light of the "highest and best use" to which
the property may be put.2°° For example, in a 1974 Tax Court memoran-
dum decision regarding valuation of a Kerrville ranch at the time of the
decedent's death, the valuation of the property was affected by the deter-
mination that its highest and best use was for recreational purposes.201 As
is the case with the open market and reasonable time requirements in the
first part of the new definition, the full knowledge of both a seller and
purchaser with regard to the uses and purposes of property is an ideal
standard. This standard clearly provides considerable latitude for both the
taxing authorities and taxpayers to either support or attack valuations on
the basis of a broad range of uses and purposes. Similarly, the require-
ment of familiarity with the enforceable restrictions on the use of property
provides additional room for strategy in arguing about the market value of
property. Case law will almost certainly evolve regarding determinations
of the enforceability of restrictions and whether knowledge of such restric-
tions would have affected the price for which property was transferred.
Finally, the third major requirement of the definition of market value is
that both seller and purchaser seek to maximize their gains and that
197. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7149 (Vernon 1960) clearly provides that the prop-
erty's value will be determined at the place of assessment. In comparison, TEX. PROP. TAX
CODE ANN. § 1.04(7) (Vernon Pam. 1979) does not so provide. Arguably, the situs at which
a taxing unit may tax tangible personal property should not necessarily be the same as the
place that determines the market value of the property.
198. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(7)(B) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
199. I.R.C. § 2031(a) provides: "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his
death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated." Value is
defined as the "fair market value at the time of the decedent's death." Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-1(b) (1958). This regulation defines fair market value as the "price at which prop-
erty would change hands between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Id.
See also United States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1965). The fairly exten-
sive case law regarding market value under this federal estate taxation section may prove
useful to Texas attorneys by providing analogous guidelines that will be helpful in applying
the definition of market value under the new Code.
200. See, e.g., Spicer v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 45, 49 (1974).
201. Id.
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neither is in a position to take advantage of the hardships of the other.20 2
This, too, is clearly an arms-length requirement and may preclude the abil-
ity of family members to sell property to each other to estabish a market
value different from that for which the property could have been trans-
ferred between unrelated parties. The maximization of gain requirement
and the open market requirement noted above are probably intended to
preclude reliance upon the value set by sales between family members.
Exemptions Generally. Before the enactment of the Property Tax Code,
the primary authority for exemptions was article 7150 of the Texas Re-
vised Civil Statutes. This article provided twenty-one categories of exemp-
tions, over half of which have been omitted from the new Code as separate
categories. Some of the property omitted will continue to be exempt if it
qualifies under a new category. The major shift in approach between the
old exemptions and the new, however, goes beyond changes in the names
of categories. The legislature appears to be relying now upon a substance
versus form approach, designating uses to which property must be put,
rather than merely characterizing property type or form of ownership. Al-
though some descriptions of the uses to which property should be put were
included in parts of the earlier statute, the new Code provides more de-
tailed descriptions.
The categories that have been omitted as separate exemptions are
county buildings,20 3 poor houses, 2°4 public charities, 205 public libraries, 20 6
market houses, 207 fire engines, 20 8 pensions, 20 9 art galleries, 210 property
owned by Boy Scouts, 2 1 demonstration farms, 2 12 and state prison prop-
erty.213 Although property in these categories is no longer specifically des-
ignated as exempt by named category, as noted above, some of it may
continue to be exempt if it meets the new requirements. For example,
county buildings and poor houses may be exempt under section 11. 11 (a) as
property owned by the state or a political subdivision thereof if they are
used for public purposes. 214 Exemptions have remained available for cer-
202. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(7)(C) (Vernon Pam. 1979). This requirement is
simliar to the requirement under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958) that neither the buyer
nor the seller be under a compulsion to buy or sell.
203. 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 159, § 1, at 303 (art. 7150(6)).
204. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 848, § 1, at 2545 (art. 7150(7)).
205. 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 159, § 1, at 303 (art. 7150(8)).
206. Id. (art. 7150(8)).
207. Id. (art. 7150(9)).
208. Id. (art. 7150(10)).
209. Id. (art. 7150(12)).
210. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 87, § i, at 185 (art. 7150(14)).
211. 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 85, § 1, at 255 (art. 7150(15)).
212. 1926 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 12, § 1, at 19 (art. 7150(16)).
213. 1930 Tex. Gen. Laws, 5th Spec. Sess., ch. 49, § I, at 191-92 (art. 7150(17)); 1930 Tex.
Gen. Laws, 5th Spec. Sess., ch. 47, § 1, at 190 (art. 7150(18)).
214. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11 (Vernon Pam. 1979) provides:
(a) Except as provided by Subsections (b) and (c) of this section, property
owned by this state or a political subdivision of this state is exempt from
taxation if the property is used for public purposes.
(b) Land owned by the Permanent University Fund is taxable for county
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tain cemeteries, 215 charitable organizations,216 youth development associa-
tions, 2 17 religious organizations,2 18 schools, 2 19 and others discussed below.
The grounds for exemption for some categories have remained the
same. 220 Organizations in other categories, however, must satisfy new re-
quirements in order to continue to claim exemption from property
taxes.2 2 1 Moreover, the legislature has consolidated numerous provisions
that were previously made available under the Texas Constitution or
under Title 122 of the Taxation Code, dealing with federal exemptions, 222
residence homestead exemptions, 223 household goods and personal ef-
fects, 2 2 4 family supplies, 225 farm products, 226 disabled veterans, 227 historic
sites, 228 homesteads of the elderly,229 and certain other miscellaneous ex-
emptions. 230
Residence Homestead and Household Goods. The exemption for resi-
purposes. Any notice required by Section 25.19 of this code shall be sent
to the State Property Tax Board, and the board shall appear in behalf of
the state in any protest or appeal relating to taxation of Permanent Uni-
versity Fund land.
(c) Agricultural or grazing land owned by a county for the benefit of public
schools under Article VII, Section 6, of the Texas Constitution is taxable
for all but state purposes. The county shall pay the taxes on the land
from the revenue derived from the land. If revenue from the land is in-
sufficient to pay the taxes, the county shall pay the balance from the
county general fund.
Subsection (a) above apparently overrules Satterlee v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., 576
S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1978), in which the supreme court held that state property must be owned
exclusively by the state to be entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxation. The court's
holding was premised on art. 7150(4), which provided that land must belong exclusively to
the state to be entitled to exemption from taxation. Section 11. 11 (a) has eliminated the word
exclusively and requires only that the property be owned by the state. TEX. PROP. TAX
CODE ANN. § 11. 1 l(a) (Vernon Pam. 1979). In addition to the exemption of certain county
buildings and poor houses under this statute, public libraries and fire engines may also be
exempt. Id. The taxability of land held in connection with certain educational purposes is
consistent with the exemption for schools under § 11.21. The latter exempts from taxation
the buildings and tangible personal property owned and used in connection with a school,
but does not exempt land. Id. § 11.21.
215. Id. § 11.17.
216. Id. § 11.18.
217. Id. § 11.19.
218. Id. § 11.20.
219. Id. § 11.21.
220. The exemptions for veterans' organizations, the Texas Federation of Women's
Clubs, private enterprise demonstration associations, and buffalo and cattalo have remained
basically the same under the new Code. See TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.23(a), (b), (e),
(f) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
221. For example, charitable organizations, youth development associations, religious
organizations, and schools must meet stricter requirements under the new Code. See text
accompanying notes 247-307 infra.
222. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.12 (Vernon Pam. 1979).
223. Id. § 11.13.
224. Id. § il.14.
225. Id. § 11.15.
226. Id. § 11.16.
227. Id. § 11.22.
228. Id. § 11.24.
229. Id. § 11.26.
230. Id. § 11.23.
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dence homesteads and household goods is contained in section 11.13 of the
Code, which entitles a family or single adult to an exemption from taxa-
tion for both state and county purposes of $3,000 of the assessed value of
his residence homestead. 231 Additionally, with regard to taxation by a
school district, an adult is entitled to an exemption of $5,000 of the ap-
praised value of his residence homestead. 232 Disabled adults or those
adults who are sixty-five or older are entitled to a special exemption of
$10,000 of the appraised value of their residence homesteads from taxation
by a school district.233 This $10,000 exemption is in addition to the $5,000
regular exemption from taxation by a school district.234 In addition, sec-
tion 11.13 provides that the governing body of a taxing unit or the quali-
fied voters of a taxing unit may approve an additional exemption from
taxation by a taxing unit, for persons who are disabled or over sixty-five, of
$3,000 or more of the appraised value of the residence homestead. 235 Once
adopted, this exemption may be either repealed, decreased, or increased by
the governing body offering the exemption or by a majority of the voters of
the taxing unit. 236 Section 11.13 provides that if this exemption is adopted
by a county that has levied a tax under article VII, section 1-a of the Texas
Constitution, the approved exemption may not be aggregated for county
tax purposes with the section 11.13(a) exemption of $3,000 of the assessed
value of the residence homestead.237 Section 11.13 places further limita-
tions on the exemptions available thereunder. For example, joint or com-
munity owners may not receive the same exemption for the same residence
homestead in the same year under this section, and similarly, an eligible
disabled person may not receive both a disabled person's exemption and
an elderly person's residence homestead exemption. 238
The exemptions from taxation by a school district for adults, as well as
the exemption for individuals who are disabled or sixty-five years or older,
231. Id. § 11.13. Although the $3,000 residential homestead exemption was not provided
for in art. 7150, the Texas Constitution exempts from taxation the first $3,000 of value of a
residential homestead for all state and county purposes. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-a, I-b.
The constitution makes clear that for state purposes the exemption is based on the assessed
value of the homestead. Id. art. VIII, § I-b. As to county taxation, however, the constitu-
tion does not state whether the exemption is to be based on assessed value or fair market
value. Id. art. VIII, § I-a. Section 11.13, which incorporates the constitutional exemptions,
makes clear that the county exemption is to be based on the assessed value of the residential
homestead. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13(a) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
232. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13(b) (Vernon Pam. 1979). This provision incor-
porates the exemption provided by TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § l-b(c).
233. TEX. PROP. TAX. CODE ANN. § 11.13(c) (Vernon Pam. 1979). The $10,000 exemp-
tion was apparently adopted pursuant to TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § l-b(c), which permits the
legislature by general law to exempt an amount not exceeding $10,000 of the market value of
the residence homestead of a person who is disabled or over 65 years of age.
234. The $3,000 exemption permissible under § 11.13(d) pertains to exemption from a
taxing unit, which is broader than the exemption from taxation by school districts as pro-
vided in subsections (b) and (c) of § 11.13.
235. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § ll.13(d)-(e) (Vernon Pam. 1979). Section 11.13(d)
provides an exemption for disabled individuals while § 11. 13(c) limits its exemption to dis-
abled adults.
236. Id. § 11.13(f).
237. Id. § 11.13(g).
238. Id. § 11.13(h).
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may be disregarded by the assessor and collector for a taxing unit where
two conditions are met.239 The first is that, prior to adoption of the exemp-
tion, the taxing unit has pledged the taxes for the payment of a debt.240
The second is that an allowance of the exemption would impair the con-
tractual obligation creating the debt. 24'
An exemption for household goods and personal effects that are neither
held nor used for the production of income is contained in section 11.14 of
the Code.242 Household goods are defined to include property that is used
primarily in or around a residence by the residents and guests such as fur-
nishings, utensils, appliances, and other tangible personal property.243
Personal effects are defined to include only that tangible personal property
that is normally worn or carried by an individual or used by him in per-
sonal, recreational, or other activities not involving the production of in-
come.2 " The statute excludes from this definition such property as motor
vehicles, boats, trailers registered for operation on a highway, or mobile
homes designed for occupancy as a dwelling. 245 The Code provides sepa-
rate exemptions for family supplies for home or farm use.246
Charitable Organizations. The exemption under prior law for institutions
of purely public charity has been removed. 247 This exemption may con-
tinue to be available for such organizations, however, if they can meet the
new tests under section 11.18.248 To qualify for exemption, the organiza-
tion must be organized exclusively for and engaged exclusively in perform-
ing one or more of the following charitable functions: (1) the provision of
medical care;249 (2) the provision of support or relief to orphans, impover-
ished persons, or victims of natural disaster;250 (3) the provision of support
239. Id. § 11.13(i).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. § 11.14. Under prior law, taxpayers were entitled to an exemption not to exceed
$250 per family with respect to all household and kitchen furniture. 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws,
ch. 159, § 1, at 303 (art. 7150(l1)). The effect of the Code is to remove the $250 limit, thus
allowing an exemption for all property that qualifies under the new statute.
243. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.14(b)(l) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
244. Id. § 11.14(b)(2).
245. Id. The exclusion of mobile homes from the definition of personal effects is consis-
tent with the legislature's intent to tax such property as an improvement that meets the
definition of real property. See TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(2) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
246. Id. § 11.15.
247. Under prior law, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 848, § I, at 2545 (art. 7150(7)) exempted
from taxation:
All buildings and personal property belonging to institutions of purely public
charity, together with the lands belonging to and occupied by such institu-
tions, including hospital parking facilities, not leased or otherwise used with a
view to profit, unless such rent and profits and all monies and credits are ap-
propriated by such institutions solely to sustain such institutions and for the
benefit of the sick and disabled members and their families and the burial of
the same, or for the maintenance of persons when unable to provide for them-
selves, whether such persons are members of such institutions or not.
248. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18 (Vernon Pam. 1979).
249. Id. § ll.18(c)(l)(A).
250. Id. § 11.18(c)(l)(B).
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to elderly persons or the handicapped; 25' (4) preservation of an historical
landmark or site;252 (5) promotion or operation of a museum, library, zoo,
dramatic arts theater, symphony, orchestra, or choir;25 3 (6) promotion or
provision of humane treatment for animals;254 (7) acquisition, storage,
transportation, sale, or distribution of water for public use;255 (8) provision
of services such as those provided by a volunteer fire department for little
or no compensation;256 (9) promotion of athletic development of young
people under the age of 18;257 and (10) preservation or conservation of
wildlife.258 Each of the first three functions must be performed without
regard to the beneficiary's ability to pay.25 9 In addition to providing one
of the functions just noted, the organization must avoid the accrual of dis-
tributable profits or the realization of private gain in any form other than a
reasonable allowance for compensation for services rendered.260 Finally,
the organization's charter, by-laws, or other regulations adopted to govern
its affairs must pledge its assets for use in performing its charitable func-
tions and direct that upon termination of the organization, the assets will
be transferred to a qualified educational, religious, or other charitable or-
ganization in Texas. 261
The requirements for exemption as a charitable organization resemble
the tests provided by the Internal Revenue Code for determining whether
an organization is exempt from federal income tax.262 Section 501(c)(3),
for example, requires that an organization be organized and operated ex-
251. Id. § !1.18(c)(I)(C).
252. Id. § i l.18(c)(I)(D). The Code provides a separate exemption from taxation for
part or all of the assessed value of such a structure if the structure qualifies under § 11.24.
Id. § 11.24.
253. Id. § I l.18(c)(i)(E). Although the specific exemption for art galleries provided by
art. 7150(14), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 87, § 1, at 185, has been removed, perhaps organiza-
tions previously exempt under that section may continue to qualify for exemption under
§ 11.18 if the organization qualifies as a charitable organization that promotes a museum or
similar undertaking.
254. TEX PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18 (c)(I)(F) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
255. Id. § 11.18(c)(I)(G).
256. Id. § 11.18(c)(l)(H).
257. Id. § 11.18(c)(I)(I).
258. Id. § 11.18(c)(l)(J).
259. Id. § 11.18(c)(I)(A)-(C).
260. Id. § 11.18(c)(2). In addition, if the organization is engaged in performing one of
the functions provided in the final seven categories, it must be organized as a nonprofit
corporation as defined by the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 1396-1.01 to -11.01 (Vernon 1962 & Pam. 1979).
261. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(c)(3) (Vernon Pam. 1979). The purpose of
these requirements appears to be to insure that the organization will not be operated in a
way that results in a distribution of profits or a realization of private gains by shareholders
upon termination.
262. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)provides:
Charitable organizations that are exempt from federal income tax include:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual . . ..
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clusively for specified purposes and that the net earnings of the organiza-
tion must not inure to the benefit of a private individual or shareholder. 263
Because of this similarity, Texas charitable organizations attempting to
comply with the new law may benefit by examining the case law that has
developed under section 501(c)(3).
Both buildings and tangible personal property owned by a qualifying
charitable organization are exempt from taxation.264 With one exception,
this property must, however, be used exclusively by the organization. 265
The exception is that the use of exempt property by persons other than
charitable organizations will not result in the loss of an exemption where
the use is incidental to use by qualifying charitable organizations and is
limited to activities benefiting the beneficiaries of such organizations that
own or use the property.266 The description of property exempt from taxa-
tion includes land "reasonably necessary" for the use of the buildings.267
Additionally, although no specific exemption is provided for a charita-
ble organization's endowment funds invested exclusively in bonds, mort-
gages, or certain other property,268 the Code does exempt such funds
owned by certain youth development organizations, 269 religious organiza-
tions,270 and schools.27' The legislature's failure to provide an exemption
for a charity's endowment funds, however, raises two interesting questions.
First, on what basis was this exemption provided to youth development
associations, religious organizations, and schools, but not to charitable or-
ganizations? Secondly, is it possible for a charitable organization to obtain
an indirect exemption for these funds? The answer to the latter question
appears to be yes. If a charity invests its endowment funds in intangible
personal property such as certificates of deposit, annuities, pensions, or
other such property interests, the invested funds may be exempt under sec-
In light of the similarities between the provision enacted by the Texas Legislature and that
provided by Congress, it seems curious that the Texas Legislature did not simply provide a
blanket exemption for organizations that qualify under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The legislature
apparently made a policy decision that certain organizations merit exemption from ad
valorem taxation whether or not they qualify under § 501(c)(3). With respect to those orga-
nizations granted an exemption, the restrictions under Texas law are not as strict as those
under federal law. For example, although Texas law prohibits, to a certain extent, the reali-
zation of private gain, the legislature fails to prohibit self-dealing activities through which
individuals can realize gain in forms other than those prohibited. Cf. I.R.C. § 4941 (self-
dealing prohibited). Certainly, however, public policy motivations and the potential sub-
stantial loss of revenues have not motivated the Texas Legislature to the degree that they
have the United States Congress.
263. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
264. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(a) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
265. Id. § I1.18(a)(2).
266. Id. § 11.18(b).
267. See id. § 11.18(e).
268. The absence of a specific exemption for endowment funds is in line with the previ-
ous statutory policy of taxing money as personal property. See 1879 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 40,
§ 3, at 39, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1339 (1898).
269. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.19(c) (Vernon Pam. 1979); see notes 273-78 infra
and accompanying text.
270. Id. § 11.20(b); see notes 279-95 infra and accompanying text.
271. Id. § 11.21(c).
19801
SO UTH WESTERN L,4 W JO URNAL
tion 11.02.272
Youth Development Associations. The exemption under prior law for orga-
nizations that are engaged in providing the threefold religious, educa-
tional, and physical development of young persons has also been changed
under the Code. 27 3 Section 11.19 now provides a partial exemption from
taxation for the tangible property of such organizations. 274 Section 11.19
modifies prior law by requiring the association to operate in a manner that
does not result in the accrual of distributable profits or the realization of
private gain in any form other than a reasonable allowance for compensa-
tion for services rendered. 275 Additionally, the association's charter, by-
laws, or other regulations adopted by it must both pledge its assets for use
in performing its youth development functions and direct that upon termi-
nation of the association, its assets will be transferred to a qualified chari-
table, educational, religious, or youth development association in Texas.
276
Although section 11.19 imposes new requirements for the youth devel-
opment exemption, it provides additional protection for a qualified associ-
ation. Exempt tangible property will not lose its exemption by reason of
use by persons who are not qualified youth development associations,
where such use is incidental to the use by qualified associations and bene-
fits the individuals served by the qualified associations. 277 Additionally,
endowment funds owned by the association are exempt if they are used
exclusively to support the association and are invested exclusively in mort-
gages, bonds, or property purchased at a foreclosure sale in order to satisfy
or protect the bonds or mortgages.
27 8
272. Id. § 11.02(a); see id. § 1.04(6), which defines intangible personal property to in-
clude, among others, stocks, bonds, notes, demands or time deposits, certificate of deposits,
and pensions.
273. Prior law exempted the following from tax:
[AIll property owned or used exclusively and reasonably necessary, in con-
ducting any association engaged in the joint and threefold religious, educa-
tional and physical development of boys and girls, young men and young
women, operating under a State or National Organization of like character,
and not leased or otherwised used with a view to profit other than for the
purpose of maintaining the buildings and Association, and all endowment
funds of the above mentioned religious institutions, not used with a view to
profit but for the purpose of maintaining the Association and buildings in do-
ing religious work and for the educational or physical development of boys
and girls, young men and young women ....
1937 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 201, § 1, at 401 (art. 7150(2a)).
274. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.19 (Vernon Pam. 1979). Section 11.19 exempts
from taxation only tangible property, which includes both real property and tangible per-
sonal property. As a general rule, it does not exempt from taxation such an association's
intangible personal property. Nonetheless, certain endowment funds are exempted from
taxation. See notes 269-71 supra and accompanying text.
275. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.19(d)(2) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
276. Id. § 1 l.19(d)(4). These prerequisites to qualified status are identical to those im-
posed on charitable organizations discussed at notes 260-61 supra and accompanying text.
277. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.19(b) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
278. Id. § 11.19(c). Note, however, that foreclosure-sale property held by an endowment
fund in excess of two years following purchase at the foreclosure sale is not exempt from
taxation. The section's language concerning investment of the funds gives rise to an inter-
pretive problem. It is uncertain whether the section requires investment of the funds or
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Religious Organizations. Certain property of religious organizations is ex-
empt from taxation if the organization qualifies under section 11.20.279
The new legislation has added three requirements necessary for such qual-
ification. The first is that the organization must be organized and operated
primarily to engage in religious worship or to promote the spiritual devel-
opment or well-being of individuals.280 Additionally, it must operate in a
manner that would not result in the accrual of distributable profits or the
realization of private gain in any form other than a reasonable allowance
for compensation for services rendered. 281 Finally, the organization's
charter, by-laws, or other regulations adopted by it must pledge its assets
for use in performing its religious functions282 and must direct that upon
termination of the organization the assets be transferred to a charitable,
educational, or religious organization in Texas. 283
Certain real property and tangible personal property owned by religious
organizations are expressly exempted from taxation by section 11.20. For
example, a qualified organization's real property is exempt if it is used
primarily as a place of regular religious worship and is reasonably neces-
sary for engaging in such worship.284 Similarly, such an organization's
whether the funds, if invested, must be invested in bonds, mortgages, or property purchased
at a foreclosure sale.
279. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20 (Vernon Pam. 1979). Under prior law, art.
7150(1) exempted property used by a church or by a religious society, but only if the prop-
erty was used exclusively as a dwelling place for ministers and the grounds attached to such
buildings were necessary for the proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment thereof. Moreover,
the property could yield no revenue to the organization. See 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 124,
§ 1, at 211.
280. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(c)(1) (Vernon Pam. 1979). As in the case of
charitable organizations, the legislature appears to have adopted standards similar to those
used under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Since a qualified organization, however, need only be orga-
nized and operated "primarily" for the necessary purposes, the Texas test is not as strict as
the "organized and operated exclusively" test under federal law. The emphasis on worship
and individuals raises the question whether this statute will preclude exemption for property
belonging to an association of churches. Arguably, such associations do not operate prima-
rily to engage in religious worship or to promote the spiritual development or well-being of
individuals. Instead, they may be viewed as operating primarily to promote denominational
or other religious interests that are not centered on worship or individuals.
281. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(c)(2) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
282. The Code does not define the term "religious functions," but does define "religious
worship." The latter means "individual or group ceremony or meditation, education, and
fellowship, the purpose of which is to manifest or develop reverence, homage, and commit-
ment in behalf of a religious faith." Id. § 11.20(e). Religious functions are likely to be those
that are necessary or incidental to the implementation of religious worship.
283. Id. § 11.20(c)(3).
284. Id. § 11.20(a)(l). The Code does not define what constitutes regular religious wor-
ship. Presumably, weekly or monthly worship would suffice. To the extent that longer peri-
ods are involved, however, a showing that a cyclical time pattern was consistently followed
might allow for qualification. For example, if a church holds religious seminars or fellow-
ship meetings every three months on certain property, perhaps that property could qualify
for exemption.
Many religious organizations own real property that may no longer qualify under the new
statute. Organizations that own church camps or picnic grounds, for example, may be taxed
on these properties unless they can meet the new test. In order to establish primary use of
such locations as a place of regular religious worship, as well as to show that the property is
reasonably necessary for engaging in such worship, the organization should begin to main-
tain records or logs of activities conducted thereon. Note, however, that religious organiza-
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tangible personal property is exempt if it is reasonably necessary for en-
gaging in worship at a place of regular religious worship.285 The new real
property exemption appears to be narrower than the prior exemption
under article 7150.286 The exemption for tangible personal property, how-
ever, is broader in some respects than under previous law. The previous
exemption was limited to the books and furniture contained in property
owned by a religious organization for the exclusive use as a dwelling place
for ministers.287 Tangible personal property under the new definition in-
cludes a number of additional kinds of property other than those in the
two categories just noted. Section 11.20 requires, however, that the prop-
erty must be reasonably necessary for engaging in worship.288
The real property used exclusively as a residence for clergymen remains
exempt if it is reasonably necessary for use as such a residence. 289 The
individual living therein must be able to establish that his principle occu-
pation is to serve in the clergy of the religious organization. 290 Moreover,
tions may be structured in a manner such that a subdivision thereof, which was organized to
hold the property and to conduct activities theron, could be classified as a youth develop-
ment association under id. § 11.19. A religious organization should therefore give consider-
ation to this alternative when it holds property it intends to use primarily for youth
development.
285. Id. § 11.20(a)(2). The exemption for tangible personal property reasonably neces-
sary for engaging in worship provides a broader exemption for religious organizations than
was available under prior law. The only such exempt property under prior law consisted of
books and furniture in the dwelling place for ministers. 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 124, § 1,
at 211 (article 7 150(1)). To the extent that tangible personal property can meet the new tests,
however, additional property will be able to qualify for exemption.
286. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1620(a)(1) (Vernon Pam. 1979). Prior law exempted
"actual places of religious worship." 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 124, § 1, at 211 (art. 7150(1)).
There was no requirement that the property be used primarily as a place of regular religious
worhip or that the property be reasonably necessary for engaging in religious worship.
Therefore, real property that was used for religious worship on an annual basis would tech-
nically be exempt under the old law.
Since the statute does not provide a description of what quantum of use satisfies the re-
quirement that property be used "primarily" as a place of regular religious worship, require-
ments regarding the intent of worshippers and the extent of their activities on the property
will presumably be developed by case law.
287. 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 124, § 1, at 211 (art. 7150(1)).
288. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(a)(2) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
289. Id. § I 1.20(a)(3). This property must be owned by the religious organization, rather
than by a clergyman. Under prior law, the exemption for church-owned property used as a
clergyman's residence was limited to one acre. 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 396, § 1, at 898.
(art. 7150b). The Code has removed the one-acre limitation, instead requiring that the prop-
erty be "reasonably necessary" for use as a residence.
290. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1l.20(a)(3)(A) (Vernon Pam. 1979). Under prior
law, the exemption for a church residence was contained in two articles. Under art. 7150(1)
such property was exempt if it was "for the exclusive use as a dwelling place for the minis-
ters of such church." 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 124, § 1, at 211. Similarly, art. 7150b pro-
vided an exemption if the chlirch-owned property was "for the exclusive use as a dwelling
place for the ministry of such church." ,1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 396, § I, at 898. Article
7150b further provided, however, that " 'ministry of such church' means ... persons whose
principal occupation is that of serving in the clergy, ministry, priesthood, or presbytery of an
organized church or religion." Id. In McCreless v. City of San Antonio, 454 S.W.2d 393,
395 (Tex. 1970), the Texas Supreme Court held that this proviso exempted from ad valorem
taxes a church-owned residence for a Methodist district superintendent who was an or-
dained minister, but whose principal duties were administrative and supervisory. The court
in McCreless concluded that the superintendent was serving in the clergy of an organized
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the real property will be exempt only if it produces no revenue for the
organization.291 Any tangible personal property owned by the organiza-
tion that is reasonably necessary for use as a qualified residence is also
exempt.
29 2
The Code incorporates previous law allowing an additional exemption
from taxation for those endowment funds owned by a qualified organiza-
tion that are used exclusively to support the organization and are invested
exclusively in mortgages, bonds, or property purchased at a foreclosure
sale in order to satisfy or protect the bonds or mortgages. 293 Moreover, the
legislation precludes the loss of exemption for real property used primarily
as a place of worship and tangible personal property reasonably necessary
to worship as a result of the use of such property for occasional secular
purposes. 294 The Code further provides, however, that all income derived
from use for occasional secular purposes must be devoted exclusively to
the maintenance and development of the property as a place of religious
worship. 295
Schools. A school must now met three requirements under section 11.21
in order to qualify for exemption from ad valorem taxes. The school must
normally maintain a regular faculty and curriculum and have a regularly
organized body of students attending the place where educational func-
tions are carried on.296 Additionally, the school must avoid the accrual of
distributable profits or the realization of gain in any form other than a
reasonable allowance for compensation for services rendered. 297 Finally,
the organization's charter, bylaws, or other regulations adopted to govern
its affairs must impose the same two restrictions upon its assets as required
for religious and charitable organizations.298 First, the organization must
pledge its assets for use in performing its educational functions, and sec-
ondly, its assets must be transferred to a qualified charitable or religious
church even though he was not assigned to a particular church of the religious organization.
Id. at 394. It would therefore appear that such persons will continue to be within TEX.
PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(a)(3)(A) (Vernon Pam. 1979), which requires the individual
to be one "whose principal occupation is to serve in the clergy of the religious organization."
291. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § ll.20(a)(3)(B) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
292. Id. § 1 l.20(a)(4).
293. Id. § 11.20(b). This property is not exempt from taxation, however, if it is held for
more than two years immediately following the purchase at the foreclosure sale. Id.
294. Id. § 11.20(d).
295. Id.
296. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.21 (Vernon Pam. 1979). The requirement of a
regular faculty and regularly organized body of students does not preclude individually-
tutored or part-time educational programs that are conducted in addition to the regular
program. See id. § 11.21(b). In fact, the legislature does not appear to preclude qualifica-
tion for a school that lacks the requisites at one time or another. The requirement is that the
faculty and body of students be "normally" maintained. Thus, disruptions in the school's
regular schedule or the closing of an organization's activities for a short time should not
disqualify the organization under this section.
297. Id. § 11.21(d)(2). As noted in the discussions regarding other exemptions, this re-
quirement appears to be an adoption of the prohibition against the inurement of benefit to
individuals under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
298. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § ll.21(d)(3) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
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organization or school in Texas upon termination. 299
The buildings and tangible personal property owned by such an organi-
zation will be exempt if three other tests are met. First, the school must be
operated exclusively by the person owning the property.300 Moreover,
with one exception, the buildings and tangible personal property must be
used exclusively for educational functions.30 Finally, the property must
be reasonably necessary for the operation of the school.30 2 The single ex-
ception to the requirement that the property be used exclusively for educa-
tional functions is provided by section 11.21(b).303  This subsection
precludes the loss of an exemption where the property is used for functions
other than educational ones if such functions are incidental to the use of
the property for educational purposes. 30 4 Any such incidental use, how-
ever, must benefit the students or faculty of the school.305 Also exempt
from taxation are endowment funds owned by a person who operates a
school if such funds are used exclusively to support the school.30 6 The
funds must be invested exclusively in mortgages, bonds, or property
purchased at a foreclosure sale to satisfy or protect the mortgages or
bonds.307
Disabled Veterans. The legislature included in the Code, with minor
modifications, the prior exemption for certain property of disabled veter-
ans who are residents of Texas. 308 A disabled veteran is defined as a vet-
eran of the armed services of the United States whom the Veterans'
Administration or another branch of the armed services in which he served
has classified as disabled and whose disability is service-connected. 309
299. Id.
300. Id. § 11.21(a)(l). This provision appears to deny an exemption to the person own-
ing the property if he rents the school or hires another organization to operate the school.
This is not clear, however, and perhaps the legislature contemplated an exemption for an
individual who operated the school exclusively, whether directly or indirectly. In the latter
event, although the owner could obtain an exemption even though he hired another to oper-
ate the school, he could not obtain an exemption if he merely rented the property to a school
operated exclusively by another individual or organization.
301. Id. § 11.21(a)(2).
302. Id. § 11.21(a)(3).
303. Id. § 11.21(b).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. § 11.21(c). The endowment funds must be owned by a person who operates a
school that is qualified under this section. Id. This requirement is broader than the exemp-
tion for taxation of buildings and tangible personal property. The latter exemption is ex-
tended only to a person who operates the school exclusively. Under the endowment fund's
exemption, however, a person who operates a school indirectly for the owner of the property
would be entitled to an exemption. In fact, both he and the true owner of the property
would be entitled to an exemption for any qualified endowment funds owned by either of
them. Note also that although the funds must be used exclusively for the support of the
school, there is no requirement that they be used exclusively to support the school's educa-
tional functions.
307. Id. Property acquired at such a foreclosure sale that is held by the endowment fund
for more than two years immediately following purchase is not exempt from taxation. Id.
308. Id. § 11.22. The previous exemption may be found at 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 719,
art. XX, § 1, at 2316-18 (art. 7150(h)).
309. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.22(h)(3) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
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These veterans are entitled to an exemption from taxation ranging from
$1,500 to $3,000 of the assessed value of property owned and designated by
them.310 The amount of the exemption varies according to the veteran's
percentage of disability.31' Special provision, however, is made for dis-
abled veterans who are (1) sixty-five years of age and have a disability
rating of at least ten percent, (2) totally blind in one or both eyes, or (3)
have lost the use of one or more limbs.312 A veteran who is within one of
these provisions is entitled to an exemption from taxation of $3,000 of the
assessed value of property he owns and designates as the property he seeks
to apply the exemption against.313 Such an individual, however, is not
entitled to both the special exemption and the exemption under the disa-
bility rating schedule, but he may take the greatest exemption for which he
qualifies. 314
The Code includes several exemptions provided under prior law315 for
the surviving spouse and surviving children of deceased members of the
armed services and deceased disabled veterans. First, the surviving spouse
of a person who dies while on active duty in the armed services is entitled
to an exemption of $2,500 of the assessed value of property owned by the
surviving spouse. 316 In addition, the Code provides a $2,500 exemption
that is to be divided equally among the surviving children who are
younger than eighteen years of age and unmarried. 317 This exemption,
however, may be applied against only the property owned and properly
designated by the surviving children. 318 The Code also provides that the
surviving spouse of a deceased disabled veteran is entitled to an exemption
in the amount previously claimed by the deceased so long as the surviving
spouse remains unmarried. 319 In the event there is no surviving spouse,
each of the veteran's surviving children who is under eighteen years of age
and unmarried may apply his pro rata share of the veteran's exemption to
a portion of the assessed value of property owned by the child. 320 Unlike
the prohibition against aggregation of exemptions for the disabled veteran,
both the surviving spouse and the surviving children may aggregate the
exemptions they are entitled to under the Code,321 with one exception. An
individual may not aggregate an exemption received as a surviving spouse
310. Id. § 11.22(a). Under prior law, a qualified individual was not restricted as to the
property that could be credited with the exemption. Under the Code, however, the individ-
ual may claim the exemption "against only one property, which must be the same for every
taxing unit in which the individual claims the exemption." Id. § 11.22(f).
311. Id.
312. Id. § 11.22(b).
313. Id. § 11.22(b), (f).
314. Id. § 11.22(e)(I).
315. See 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 719, art. XX, § 1, at 2317.
316. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.1.22(d)(1) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
317. Id. § 11.22(d)(2). Prior law provided that surviving children had to be under 21
years of age and unmarried. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 719, art. XX, § 1, at 2317.
318. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.22(d)(2) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
319. Id. § 11.22(c).
320. Id. Surviving children must designate property in the same manner as disabled
veterans and surviving spouses.
321. See TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.22(e) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
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with an exemption received as a surviving child.322
Other Exemptions. Some of the exemptions provided for under previous
law have been placed in a new category entitled "miscellaneous exemp-
tions." Section 11.23 continues to provide exemptions for veterans' organi-
zations, the Texas Federation of Women's Clubs, private enterprise
demonstration associations, buffalo and cattalo, the Nature Conservancy
of Texas, Inc., the Texas Congress of Parents and Teachers, theater
schools, bio-medical research corporations organized under the Texas
Non-Profit Corporation Act, and community service clubs.323 The Code
also allows taxing authorities to exempt from taxation part or all of the
assessed value of certain historic sites and land.324 Finally, the Code limits
the amount of ad valorem tax that may be imposed by a school district on
the residence homestead of individuals over sixty-five years of age.325
Pensions. Annual pensions granted by Texas or the United States have
been omitted as a specific category from the exemption provisions of the
Code.326 There is, however, a basis for arguing that such pensions should
remain exempt. Since pensions are included in the definition of intangible
personal property under section 1.04(6),327 they should be exempt under
section 11.02(a), which exempts intangible property except as provided by
subsection (b) of that section. 328 Although subsection (b) allows the taxa-
tion of, among other things, the intangible property of unincorporated
banks, transportation businesses, insurance companies, and savings and
loan associations, it does not include interests in intangible personal prop-
erty that have been granted by the state or the United States to private
322. Id.
323. Id. § 11.23.
324. Id. § 11.24. This provision of the Code basically incorporates the prior law under
art. 7150i, which may be found in 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 358, § i, at 950. Although the
prior law provided that an exemption from property taxation could be granted for part or all
of the value of a structure, the Code provides for an exemption of part or all of the "as-
sessed" value.
325. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.26 (Vernon Pam. 1979). The Code mandates for
persons over 65 years of age an exemption from taxation by a school district of $10,000 of
the appraised value of his residence homestead. Id. § i. 13(a). At the discretion of a school
district or its qualified voters, such a person may be entitled to a further exemption from
school district taxation. Id. § 11.13(d). See discussion on resident homestead exemption in
notes 231-46 supra and accompanying text. Section 11.26 of the Code effectively limits a
school district's ability to tax persons over 65 years of age by providing that a school district
may not increase the total annual amount of ad valorem taxes above the amount it imposed
in the first year that the individual qualified his residence homestead for the exemption
under § 11,13(c). There is an exception to the restriction against increasing ad valorem taxes
if the individual improves his homestead. The improvements for which additional tax may
be imposed are those other than improvements required to comply with governmental re-
quirements or repairs. Id. § 11.26(b).
326. Pensions were previously exempt under art. 7150(12). 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
159, § 1, at 303.
327. TEX. PROP. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(6) (Vernon Pam. 1979).
328. Id. § 11.02(a) provides the general rule that, except as otherwise provided, intangi-
ble personal property is not taxable.
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individuals. Such pensions therefore should remain exempt from taxation
on the basis of their status as intangible personal property.
V. OTHER LEGISLATION
In addition to enacting the Property Tax Code, the legislature amended
one article and enacted two new articles. Article 7146 was amended to
provide that, even though a mobile home is within the definition of real
property, it is personal property for the purpose of enforcing a tax lien.329
Article 7146, however, is repealed, effective January 1, 1982, by the Prop-
erty Tax Code.
Article 7150.1 was enacted to provide an exemption from ad valorem
taxes for solar and windpower energy devices. 330 The exemption of such
devices applies to all ad valorem taxes levied by any taxing unit, including
the state.33' The definition of "solar energy device" is strictly limited to
those devices that provide "for the collection, storage, or distribution of
solar or wind energy for subsequent use as thermal, mechanical, or electri-
cal energy. ' 332 To insure that the exemption is not abused, the legislature
has provided that a solar energy device does not include energy devices
that can be used regardless of the energy source.333
Finally, the legislature added article 7150o, which permits taxing units,
other than the state, to reappraise property damaged in a natural disas-
ter.334 Such property must be located within an area declared to be a natu-
ral disaster area by the President of the United States or the Governor of
Texas.335 Additionally, if a taxing unit adopts the reappraisal, the taxes
must be prorated for the year in which the property was damaged by the
natural disaster. 336
329. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7146(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980). This legislation,
among other things, enables the state to comply with less stringent notice and advertisement
requirements in the event of a sale of the mobile home to satisfy a tax lien. The amendment
also forecloses the taxpayer from utilizing the redemption statutes in id. arts. 7283-7291 in
the event the mobile home is sold for payment of taxes.
330. Id. art. 7150.1.
331. Id. art. 7150.1(a).
332. Id. art. 7150.1(d).
333. Id.
334. Id. arts. 7150o(a), (c).
335. Id. art. 7150o(a).
336. Id. art. 7150o(b). For example, if the disaster occurred on July I st of a taxable year,
the taxing unit is required to assess full taxes from January I to June 30, and then may
appraise the damaged property at a reduced value for the remaining six months of the taxa-
ble year.
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